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THE COURTS, Fl:DERALISM, AND THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, I 920-2000 
I:DW1\l{D A. PLll{Cl!LL, JI,. 
The history of American federalism in the twentieth century falls into thrt'c 
distinct periods. The era of.post-Reconstructioll federalism, which hegall in 
the late nilleteenth celltury, ended in the years after 1 929 when a sltattcri11g 
series of domestic a11d international crises combined with rhe innovative 
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt to reoriem the nation's laws, politics, 
and institutions. The resulting "New Deal Order .. lasted for allllost fivL· 
decades before crumbling in the ce!ltury's last quarter when massive social, 
cultural, economic, and political changes cornhined with rite dralllatizing 
presidency of Rollaid Rea,,an to begin reorientin« rhe system once a«ain. 
Ar century's end, rhe nat::,re and ~·ourse of that,-,emcrging era rem,~m-d 
unsettled. 
I. TIIE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF AMFRIC:AN FEDFRALISI\I 
With a de facto default rule favoring decentralization, American federalism 
is a governmental systelll based 011 the cx1stenn' of independenr political 
Power at both stare ,111d national levels. Its essence lies, first, 111 rhe insti-
tutional tensions that the Constitution structured between the two levels 
of" I l · I I 1· I . . I . ,-,overnrnent, anL seconL, Ill t 1e comp ex processes o L eus1on ma ,lllg 
that the Constitution established to maintain satisfactory relario11s lx-rweell 
the two levels. Those processes were cornplex because they involved, on the 
national side, three distinct and counrcrpoised hra11Clws of govcrnmem 
and, on rhe state side, a growing multitude of equal, independem, and 
often conflicting governing units. In theory, ,md somcrimes ill practice, 
national power served to foster economic integration and efficiency, faC1l-
1tare the development and enforcement of desirable un1forlll standards, 
enable the people to deal effectively with problems national and interna-
tional in scope, protect the security and general welfare of the nation as 
a Whole, and safeguard liberty by check111.l.!; the potential tyranny of local 
ftJajorities. Conversely, also in theory and sometimes in practice, state power 
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served to foster economic innovation and dficiency, nourish social and cul-
tural diversity, encourage democratic participation, facilitate the adoption 
of narrow solutions tailored to special local problems, and safeguard liberty 
by checking the potential tyranny of national majorities. 
As a matter of historical developmem, American federalism gave rise to 
a dynamic and fluid political system in which competing groups and coali-
tions struggled for control of the nation's diverse centers of governmental 
power and used constitutional arguments to place decision-making author-
ity over contested issues in the level and branch of government that seemed, 
at any given time, most likely to support their values, interests, and aspira-
tions. The claim of ''state sovereignty," for example, which I imi red or denied 
the authority of the national government, served a variety of diverse groups 
over the centuries: Jeffersonian Democrats in the r 790s, New England 
Federalists during the War of r 8 r 2, South Carolina nu! lifiers in the r 8 _',OS, 
Northern ami-slavery civil libertarians before the Civil War, and then from 
Reconstruction to the late twentieth century those who clefrnded racial 
segregation and disenfranchisement. The pressures generated by succes-
sive waves of such diverse groups and coalitions - themselves the products 
of relentless social and economic change - drove the system's evolution. 
Certain widely sharl'd cultural cornmitml'nts - to republican government, 
the common law, religious freedom, private property, and individual lib-
erty - combined with the idea of a written Constitution and the reality 
of institutionally divided powers to constrain and channel that evolution. 
But the system's operations and assumptions continued to shift as chang-
ing cultural values, social conditions, economic innovations, institutional 
practices, legal theories, judicial decisions, and constitutional amu1dments 
blurred or redrew the lines of state and federal authority. 
In that long and complex historical process, one issue repeatedly t'ml.'fged 
as pivotal: what institutions or procedures existed to settll' disputes ovl'r the 
respective spheres of state and federal authority; Americans debated t!wr 
issue vigorously for eight decades and then, in the Civil War and its three 
co11stiturional amemlmcnts, settled it in part. Thl' national govcrnmuit, 
not thl' states, held dispositivc authority. Neither thl' war nor its result-
ing constitutional amendments, however, answered two further questions: 
which branch or branches of the federal governml'nt held that authority) 
And how was the authority to be exercisecP Much of the history of American 
li:dcralisrn after the Civil War revolved around the contested answers given 
to those two questions, as the three f<.-deral branches - each responding to 
the values and intnests that dominatcxl it at any given timl' - adopted 
diverse and somcrirncs rn111lini11g policies that kd them to defer to state 
prerogatives on some occasions and trump them on others. 
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Indeed, as American life became increasingly centralized and homog-
enized in the late nineteenth and twenricth centuries, many of the dis-
tinctive and authentically "local" values and inrerests thar had originally 
givL·n the fr·deral system its embedded social meaning withered or became 
suspect. Some blended into emerging and widely shared national values 
and imerests; others grew attenuated or disappeared entirely; a fi_·w - most 
obviously, rhose involving racial oppression -- were explicitly repudiated 
by new national majorities and constitutional arnemlmcnts. The result was 
that the ingrained cultural understandings of the late eighteemh and early 
nit1tteenrh centuries gradually disintegrated, the lived social meaning of 
Amnican fcxleral ism grew more amorphous and contestable, and the dis-
tincrivcly local values and interests that the system protected increasingly 
appeared either narrow and parochial or vague and abstract. Over the course 
of the twentieth cemury the idea of American federal ism as a normative con-
cept - that the C:onstiturion set out clear I incs thar ddined and d isringu 1shed 
statc and federal powers - grew ever more amorphous and manipulable. 
Thus, the history of American k·deralism cannot be understood by focus-
ing solely 011 constitutional provisions or theories of frdcral1srn. The Con-
'ititution provided a sound framework of governmcllt and a shrewd system 
ot insr1tutionalized checks and balances, but it did nor draw bright or gen-
erally dcrerminative lines of aurhority between state and fi:deral power nor 
specify any particular "balance" between them. Similarly, theories of fr·dn-
alisn1 provided a range of normative base! 1 nes, but their spn i fie In junctions 
WL-re invariably construed diversely and contested sharply. Indenl, conllict-
1ng views of federalism existed from the nation's bc;..'.inning, and the passing 
Years producL"d a smorgasbord of new variations, each inspired by and suf--
fusL·d with the emerging values, interests, expccrations, and preconceptions 
of its advocates. The federal structure helped sustain rhe nation's cornmit-
rnult to Ii mired government, cultural diversity, and individual liberty, but 
Its history can be understood fully only by examining how and why its 
Practical operations evolved, its political si,~nificance shifted, its social con-
st''-ILicnces unfolded, and its ideological contours pniodically eroded and 
reformed. 
Since rhc early decades of the nineteenth cemury, the prevailing the-
'.)? held that the C:rn1stirution esrablishnl a system of "dual federalism." 
I he . · 1 ·t I I i- 'fl - I pnnup cs arrri )Utcc to t 1e system were cw. 1c nat1011a govern-
nient was one of limited and delegated powers only; the states were inde-
Ptndent sovereigns with exclusive authority over local matters reserved to 
th
en1 by the Tenth Amendmcnt; and the powers of the two governments 
Wer,, 1· . I " I " I . l I I k ' 11111tec to separate sp 1eres anc rntcnc ec to serve as c 1cc ·s on one 
another. 
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Although the actual practice of American frderalism was always more 
complicated than the thl:'ory of dual fr·dl:'ralisrn implil:'d, during the late 
ninctl'l'nth and C:',trly twentieth century fivl' acccll:'rating tkvelopmellts sub-
sta11tially rl:'shaped the systl:'m. First, spl:'ctacular revolutions 111 transporta-
tion and communications together with t!w ongoing processes of industri-
alization, urbanization, westward expansion, and economic CC:'ntralization 
remade American society. What in 1 789 had bl:'en a collection of geograph-
ically rooted, lornlly oriented, and culturally diversl:' island communities 
had by 1920 become an increasingly mobile, nationally oriented, and eco-
nomically and culturally integrated nation. Ever widening areas oflifr Wl'IT 
corning to have national significance, and Americans from coast ro coast 
increasingly fi1ced similar problems that flooded beyond the ability of indi-
vidual stares to remedy. 
Second, the powerful ninl'teenth-cl:'ntury bl:'lief that the primary func-
tion of governml:'nt was to protect privatl:' property and economic ft-cl:'dorn 
was weakenmg. Since the Civil War govl:'rnments at all levels had become 
incrl:'asingly active in attempting to deal with the massive social disruptions 
that came with urbanization and industrialization. Repeatedly the states 
increased taxes and expandl:'d their activities, ll'gislating over a widening 
variety of social and economic problems and establishing administrative 
agencies to regulate railroads, insurance companies, and many other types 
of business. They raised their funding for local governments, for example, 
from barely $50 million in 1902 to almost $Goo million by 1927. 
Third, the fcckral govu·nment was growing at an even more accelerated 
rate. Although the states still employed several times as many workl'rs and 
spent more than twicl' as much money as the federal government, thl' balance 
of power between the two was shifting. As C:'Conomic and cultural central-
ization proceeded, the political consl:'nsus that had tilted strongly toward 
decentralization in thl:' early ninC:'teL·nth Lentury was moving by century's 
end toward support of more and broader governml:'nt action at the national 
IC:'vcl. In 1 887 the fi::deral government began to USC:' its authority over inter-
state commerce to regulate the new national economy, and by the secoml 
decade of thL· twentieth century it had asserted extu1sive national control 
over interstate transportation and communications while subjecting orhn 
interstate husinl:'sses to an expanding variety of l1C:'W federal regulations. 
Fourth, running against that nationalizing current, a vehl'mcnt ITaction 
against Reconstruction among white Americans had severely constrained 
thl' power of the federal govl:'rnment to protl:'ct the rights of African Amer-
icans. Notwithstanding thl' Civil War amendments, an informal national 
SC:'ttkmcnt in the century's last decades had succl:'ssfully rl:'defined most mat-
ters involving black civil and political rights as local issul:'s that propl'rly 
fell within the exclusive authority of thl' states. Increasingly, the cries of 
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"states' rights," "state sovereignty," and the "principles of federalism" were 
identified with the esrabl ishment and preservation of racial segregation and 
disenfranchisement. 
Finally, the power of the federal judiciary was growing relative to that of' 
both Congress and the stares, and by the early twentieth cemury the l 1.S. 
Supreme Court had emerged as the ultimate - if still sharply contestl'll -
authority or1 the law of both American f,,..deralism and the new national 
economy. The nation's commitmem to law and rhe ideal of'limitnl consti-
tutional government had led Alllericans gradually to embrace rhe Court --
"the Court" as they callle ro call it - and Hs umpiring role, while rhe srruc-
ture of the federal judiciary - like that of rhe exernrive branch bur unlike 
that of Congress -allowed the Court to act relatively quickly anc.l c.leusivdy. 
The Court deterlllined the exrenr to which any governlllenr could regulate 
business and property as well as the particular level of govern1rn:nt that 
could regulate them. On rhe former issue, it held that a narrow range of 
econornic activities "affrcted with a public interest" WL'IT subwct w L'xten-
sive regulation, bur chat most business and property rclllaincd "private" 
and subject only to minimal regulation. On the latter issue, it held that 
specific economic activities found to be "closely" or "directly" relarl'll to 
interstate collllllerce were national i11 scope and hl'l1ce subject to fi:c.leral 
control under the C:ornme1-ce Clause hut that rhe bulk of such activities 
remained local and subject to regulation only by the statL·s. As a gcnl'ral 
111atter, the Court's rulings gradually extended rhe powers of the fi:c.leral 
governmenr while restricting rhe power of the states to i11trudc imo the 
Workings of the burgeonrng national lllarket. To enforce its malllLrte, the 
Courr l"l·shaped the jurisdiction of rhc lower federal courts ro make them 
ll1ore effective instruments of national judicial authority, turning rl1L·m from 
disputes between private parties over issues of local law ro suits that chal-
lenged government action or raised issues ofnarional law. l11crcasi11gly, too, 
the Court exercised its burgeoning power. I 11 Sl'VL'nty-one years up rn 1 8(,o 
It had held only 2 federal and (10 state statutes u11consr1rutio11al, bur 111 a 
mere thirty-nine years from 1898 to 19 )7 it vrndcd ')CJ federal and 1r1ri 
stare laws. · 
II. NATIONAI.I/.ATION AND TIIF DH LINI; OF 
POST-REC:ONSTRlJC:TION HDl;RALISM: FROM 
\XIOIUD \XIAR TO Tl!E CR FAT Dl;PRl'SSION 
\X!hen 1920 dawned, American federalism seemed on rhe verge ofeve11 more 
snbstanrial change. Pre-war Progressivism had focused American policies 
011 the national level, and constit~1tional alllendrnents authorizing a federal 
inconw tax and the popular election ofsenarors had expanded fednal pown 
Edu•cmi Ji. Pl/reel!. Jr: 
enormously while curtailing thl: power of state legislatures. Both amend-
ments gave thc American people a new and dirl:ct involvement in their 
national government, while the income tax provision allowcd the fedenil 
government to raise virtually uni imited amounts of money, paving the way 
for explosive growth in the future. The Supreme Court, too, had seemed 
willing to approve some widcning assertions of national power by stretch-
ing the limiting categories of business "affected with a public interest" and 
activities "closely" related to interstate commcrce. 
Most dramatic were the changes that followed American entry into World 
War I. Relying principally on their war powers, Congress and Democratic 
President Woodrow Wilson exercised unparalleled authority. They estab-
1 ished national conscription, took control of the nation's transportation and 
communications systems, imposed tight rcstrictions on the distribution of 
food and fi.1d, asserted authority over relations betwcen labor and manage-
ment, and expanded the fr:deral income tax system drastically. In addition, 
through the Espionage and Scdition Acts they prohibitcxl a variety of activ-
ities ~ including speech critical of the government~ that might interfere:: 
with the war effort. They criminalizcd, for example, "disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language" directed at thl' Constitution, thl' armcd 
forces, the government, or the flag. 1 Pcrhaps most arresting, by statute and 
then by constitutional amcndment Congress and the statcs prohibited the 
manufacture, salc, and transportation of alcoholic beverages in the United 
States. Ratified in 1 ') 19, thl' Eightcenth Amendment conferred on the fed-
eral government authority to enforce nationwide Prohibition and expanded 
its powcr into areas that had pt"l'viously been considered both local and 
private::. 
The war challenp;ed the structure of post-Reconstruction federalism in 
other ways as well. Politically, it led to the adoption of yet another nation-
alizing constitutional amendment, the Nineteenth, which prohibited the 
states from denying the vote to women and conferrcd on Congrl'ss thl' power 
to enforcc its mandate. Institutionally, the war induccd thc Supreme Court 
to back away from its umpiring role and watch passively as Congress and 
the president exercised sweeping war powers. Socially, thl' war's proclaimed 
goal of making "the world safc for dcmocracy" even hinted at the possibility 
of change in the nation's racial status quo. 
Although post-Reconstruction federalism trembled, it did not crumble::. 
The end of the war brought a suies of bitter labor strikcs, a brief but virulent 
Rc-d Scare, rcpl'ated outbrcaks of anti-black violence, rapidly rising prices 
followed by a short dcprl'ssion, and spreading resentment at the adminis-
tration's continucd usl' and abusl' of its war powers. Those events destroyed 
1 A,toi"May 16, 1918.ch.75,4uSrat.5')\. 
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Wartime unity, fragmc:ntcd Progressivism, and generated a powerful desire 
for a return to a more stable and tranquil order. 111 1920 the reaction ,1.;ave 
the Republicans control of both Congress and the prc·s1dency. With rhc help 
of returning prospnity, the Republicans mainrained thar hold for a decade, 
t"nsuring a government of" order, conservatism, business dorni11ario11, and 
minimal economic reguL1tion. Under their rule, Republicans annoumTd, 
America was entering a "New Era" of sustained LTonornic prog1Tss and 
prosperity. For almost a decade their promise seemed golden. 
The national turnaround in 1 920 induced the Court ro JTassert its author-
ity. In cautious dicta it began to suggest jll(liually enforceable limits on 
federal war powers, and in 192 r it invalidated un vagueness grounds the 
stature that had authorized federal conrrol over food during and after the war. 
Then, within two years, Warren I larding, rhc new Republican president, 
appoinred four new justices - including ex-President William I loward 'Eifr 
as ChiefJ ustice - who were more conservative and property conscious tha11 
their predecessors. The stage was set for a period of conservative judicial 
activism. 
The new 'J (di: Court moved quick! y to ensure social stabi 11 ty, 1 mpose j ud i-
cial limitations on both state and fc:deral governnwms, and protect bus1-
llc·ss, propnty, and the expandmg national market. 111 less rhan a decade 
1t invalidated legislation - in most cases measures passed liy the stares --
in approximately 140 decisions, a rate far higher than that of any previ-
Ol!s Court. Its efforts were unwirringly enhanced by a seemingly tnlm1cal 
Jllrisdictional statute enacted in 1 92 ':i- The so-called J u,li.;es· Bi 11 made the 
Colin's appd late jurisdiction almost wholly d iscretio;1ary·, thereby enabl 1ng 
It to decide freely not just how, but when and where, it would assnt its 
,lllthority. After 1925 the Court's role in American governmem continued 
to expand, and its efforts became more purposeful, as shifting coalitions of 
Jll st ices lc·arned to use the Court's new jurisd1nional discretion to set their 
<iwn agendas. 
Three of" the 'Edi: Court's early decisions 1-cvc·alnl its dncrminarion ro 
trnposc limits on government. Pe11111rfr,111ic1 Co,1! Co, 1·. 1\L1holl ( I <)22) lirn-
lttd horh state and f<.·deral pown over private property liy holdmg th,l! 
reglllatory actions that wem "too far" consrirutnl "takings" that, absent 
compensation, wne invalid under the Fifth am! Fourteenth Amend1nenrs.·' 
Sirnilarly, 1\ilki11.1 /'. Chilclrm'1 [ lo.1f!i!t1! ( 1925) invalidated a minimum wage 
law - f- I c- , · - - l I - II , d type o statute t 1t' ,ourt s conservative JUst1ces cons 1, ere, espeua y 
obnoxious. Aclk111r proclaimed freedom of contract "the ,1.;eneral rule" and 
government regulation an "exception" confined to a frw narrow categories 
of specially "public" matters."' As much as the two cases demonstrated the 
" 2 liu ll .S , ')_' 1, -. ) j,L ). 
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Court's determination to limit government regulation, however, they also 
suggested the difficulty the justices faced in their task. In each, the Court 
acknowledged that the limiting categories it used were incapable of precise 
delineation, a confession that highlighted the extent to which the lines it 
drew were the product, not simply of the Constitution, bur of the dominant 
attitudes of the era ,md the specific values of the justices themselves. 
The third decision, /3c1iley 1•. Dre:,:el /!1m1it11re Co. ( 1922), was directed 
solely at the federal government and sought to infuse new I ife into the 
idea of dual federalism. Only four years earlier the Court had struck down 
the first federal Child Labor Law, ruling in lfcm1111er 11• Dc1,~mhc1rl (1918) 
that the commerce power did not allow Congress to ban the products of 
child labor from interstate commerce. Though seemingly inconsistent with 
prior dc_:cisions, Hcm1//ler voided the child labor statute on the ground that it 
was not a true effort to regulate interstate commerce, but rather a disguised 
attempt to intrude_: into a "local" activity- the production of goods- that the 
Tenth Amendment reserved to the states. Amid a popular outcry against 
the decision, Congress respondnl with the Child Labor 'fax Act, relying 
on the i"cckral taxing power to impose special charges on employers who 
used child labor. Drexel /!11mit11re declared the_: second federal child labor 
act another subterfuge, one intended not to raise revc_:nue but to regulate ,1 
local matter. Following f lc1111111er, it held the act invalid as a violation of the 
'!<:nth Amendment. It was "the hip;h duty of this court" to protect "local 
self-government" from "national power" and to preserve the federal system 
that, the justices declared, was "the ark of our covenant." If it failed to block 
the Child Labor 'fax Law, Drexel F11rnil11re warned, Congress could use its 
taxing power "to rake_: over to its control any one of rhe great number of 
subjects of public interest" that the Constitution reserved to the states. 1 
Like earlier Courts, however, the 'fafr Court shaded its fe:-deral1sm deci-
sions to fir its social values. It ignored I-ic1111111er when Congress passed ,1 
statute prohibiting the movement of stolen vehicles in interstate commerce, 
avoided Drexel /!11rni//1re when Congrc_:ss used its taxing power to control nar-
cotics, and construed the commerce power with exceptional breadth when 
business invoked the federal antitrust laws ro break a small union's boycott 
of local employers. The Court stretched national power in the first case to 
protect private propc_:rry, in the second to allow government ro control what 
rhe justices viewed as a moral and social evil, and in the third ro check a 
potentially powerful weapon of organized labor. 
The_: particular social values that the 'fafr Court protc_:cted quickly gener-
ated political controversy. Provoking strong opposition from Progressives 
and organized labor, its decisions sparked a variety of proposals for "curbing" 
The Cr!//rl.r. Feclert1!i.1111. ,md the Federc1l Comlitllfirm. 1920--2000 I y5 
tht Court by restricting its juri~diction or requiring a supermajority vote of 
six or seven justices to i 11validate legislation. I 11 r 924 Republican Senator 
Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin helped organize a new Progressive Party 
and ran for president on a platform that indicted tht Court as an anti-
progrcssivc· and pro-busi ncss partisan. I fr· proposed a constitutional amend-
n1enr that would authorize Congress to override a11y decision invalidating 
one of its statutes. Rising to the Court's defense, most Republicans and 
Democrats castigated the proposal as a radical and destructive assault on 
the foundations of A1llcrica11 federal ism. I 11 the clcctio11 La Follette did wcl I 
for a third-party rn11diclatc, hut he was overwhclmnl in a Republican land-
sliclc. While the election revealed widespread hostility to the 'Lift Court, it 
also suggested that the great majority of Americans supported the Court's 
institutional role, even if many of them disliked some of its 111dividual 
decisions. 
Rtspo11ding to LaFollette and othn critics, Charles Warren, the nation's 
preeminent historian of the Supreme Court, seemed to speak for most Amer-
icans -- even many Progressives - when he praised the Court for playing 
an essential institutional role in the f<.·dcral system. The "cxistl·nce of the 
American form of government - a federal republic with limited national 
powers - imp! ics and requires for its presc-rvation the existence ofa Suprtme 
Court," he declared. "The rctcntio11 of such a republic is inseparably hound 
up with the retention ofa Court having authority to enforce the limitation 
of national powers." Warren articulated a liclicf that had licen spreading 
since the mid-nineteenth cemury and that had become sacred writ arnong 
conservatives by the early twcnr1nh: the Supreme Court was the anchor oi" 
American uovcrnmc11t the 11aramount bulwark 11rou·crinu the American h , h 
People and their liberties from the dangers posed by an othnwise u11con-
troliahlc and centralizing national govcrnrncnt. "It is, of course, possible to 
have a republic without a Supreme Court," Warren explained; "hut it will 
lx• a republic with a consolidated and autocratic government, a government 
111 which the States and the citizens will possess 110 right or power save such 
as Congress, in its absolute discretion, secs fit rn leave to them.'", 
Although T1fr and a majority of his Court shared both Warren's suspi-
cions of Congress and hi~ conclusions about the Court's essential role, they 
ill·vc-rtheless sought to accornmodate what they considered the reasonable 
dernands for more active government that flown! from the continuing cen-
tralization ofAmeric111 social and economic lit<.·. Cautiously, they cominued 
th e· process of expanding fr·dcral power undn the Commerce Clause and, 
111 a more i11novativc move, approved a broadened use of kderal taxing 
and spending powers. In 1\lt1_1_1ad1111el/1 1: /\lel/011 ( H)2 _-\) the Court upheld 
'Ciiarlcs \X/arrrn, Co11,~rc11. 1/1c Co111li/Jrlio11. <111(/ ilh S//jm111c C:011rl 1Bosron, 192«;), .j, c;. 
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a statute that provided fedc.:ral funds for state infant and maternity care 
programs. Th<:' decision in effect sanctioned the federal government's power 
to offer monetary grants to states conditioned on their acceptance of kd-
eral use restrictions, and it th<:'reby allowl'd Congress to legislate ~ albeit 
indirectly~ over matters that seemed entirely "local." In the 1 <)2os such 
federal grants were few in numb<:r and small in scale, but during the 11ext 
half-c<:ntury th<:y would <:xpand dramatically. 
The 'faft Court also l'Xtl'ndnl fed<:ral judicial pow<:r over the srat<:s by 
expanding the meaning of"lib<:rty" in th<: Fourteenth Am<:11dment. On one 
front it voicll'd stat<: statutes that rcstricred the educational opportunitil's 
of children. The Court held that the amendment protected certain perso11al 
and familial rights, including the right of parems to rrnr and educatl' their 
childr<:n as they wished. On a second front the Court began to co11sicll'r 
the claim that rl1<: First Amendment right of frt:e speech also constrained 
th<: states. Succ<:ssful prosecutions under the Sedition and Espiona,~l' Acts 
had provoked pownful dissents from Justices Oliver Wendell llolmes, 
Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis; and, after th<: postwar hysteria had dissipated, 
many Arn<:ricans came to bcli<:ve that governmental power to punish speech 
should be limited more tightly. In Git/011' 1'. Neu· York ( 1925) the Court 
a1111ounc-cd that the right offre<: speech recognized by the First Amendment 
was part of the "liberty" prot<:cted by the Fourrc-cnth Amendnwnt and, 
consequently, was bi11ding on the states as well as the federal govcrnmenr. 
Although the Court's decisions in these areas were fr,w, they created a rich 
seedbed for the future. 
C:onversdy, considering the rights of African Americans, the Taft Court 
left post-Reconstruction federalism <:ssentially unchanged. Refusing to 
question racial se,~re,~ation and disenfranchisement, it protected African 
American rights only in the most outrageous and exceptional cases. In 01w, 
where it granted habeas corpus rclid- to an African American sentenced 
to death in a Southern state court, it could not ignore the fact that the 
cll'fcndant had been convicted on unsubstamiated charges by an all-white 
Jury that had b<:en surroumll'd and intimidated by an angry white mob. In 
another, where it invalidated an "all-white" Texas primary clect1on system, 
it could not deny th<: explicitly racial nature of the legal discrimination or 
i rs negation of the fundamental constitutional right of all citizens to vote. 
In each case, however, the Court stressed the narrowness of its decision. 
Federal habeas corpus was rarely available, it declared, and criminal mat-
ters Wl'IT ordinarily local issues for the stares alon<: to resolve. Similarly, 
the all-white primary was unconstitutional solely because its racially dis-
criminatory natutT was explicitly written into state law. Indeed, a decade 
later the Court unanimously approved a slightly more indirect version of 
the all-white state primary, one that was equally dfrcrive in maintaining 
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black disenfranchisement but more cleverly designed as a matter of reig11ing 
constitutional law. 
For their part, the states in the 1920s continued ro set policy not only in 
matters concerning race but also in most other areas that aflc·cted daily l1k, 
and they continued as well to provide most of the government services that 
Americans received. During the r 920s the states accounted for al most three-
quarrers of all public spending and two-thirds of the taxes col lcnnl. While 
a ftw sought to sustain the tradition of pre-war reform, most conformed to 
the conservative national mood that underwrote the Republicans· New Era. 
Largdy abandon mg efforts to regulate business and enact progressive social 
legislation, they sought to trim government regulation and concTntrated 
much of their spendmg on highway construction to meet the exploding 
demands created by the automobile. lndicative of the political mood, the 
States raised most of their highway money through regressive gasol 1ne taxes, 
which by r929 accounted for 25 percent of their total rax receipts. Indeed, 
while thirteen states had enacted mildly progressive income tax laws in the 
decade after 191 r, during the New Era only one state, New l lampshire, 
adopted such a tax. As a general matter, the govc-rnments of both states and 
nation seemed in accord on the basic issues of social and econ om 1c pol icy. 
Both seemed content, for the most part, to keep a low profile and give 
business its head. 
l l l. FROM T 11 E C; IU: AT EC: 0 NO M IC TO TI I E c; R E /\T 
PSYCI IOLOCIC:AL DEPRESSION: N /\TION /\LI/I NC AN I) 
1nc:0NcEPTlJ ALIZI Ne; u 111;RTY AND UJliALITY, 1 9 ),1, .. 1 ,n, ,, 
The year 1929 witnessed the onset of the decade-long and world-wide ( ;rear 
Depression. Causing massive disruptions and hardships, the Depression 
challenged the capacities of democratic governments throughout the world. 
The resulting turmoil paved the way for Adolph I litlcr to seize power in 
Gern1any, energized the forces of international Communism, aml u I timately 
helpc·d bring on a second ;ind far more destructive world war. In the lJnitcd 
Srates it ga~e birth to the New Deal and, togcthc-r with the- war and Cold 
War that followed, transformed Amc-rican kdcralism. 
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The ravages of unemployment, bankruptcies, foreclosures, hank failut-cs, 
10st savings, and crushed hopes savaged all classes and regions. Those 1dem1-
hed with the roseate New Era of the r 920s - primarily business, the Repub-
lican Parry, and the federal judiciary - quickly became objects of angc-r and 
di st rust. Governments at all levels tried to respond to the emergency. State 
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and local agencies, however, could provide neither the relief nor the struc-
tural reforms that seemed necessary. By 19 :-1 T their resources were exhausted, 
and the national and international scope of the ever-deepening crisis was 
undeniable. The frderal government under Republican President Herbert 
1-foover became increasingly active, but it furnished far too little in the 
way of either money or leadership. The experience taught Americans two 
fundam(:'ntal kssons: that a massive governmental respons(:' was necessary 
and that only national action could possibly be adequate. 
From 1 '.>°iO to T 93(i four successive elections repudiated the Republi-
cans, and after 1932 the Democrats firmly controlled both the legislative 
and executive branches of the frderal government. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's Nt:w Deal initiated a wide range of efforts to provide emergency 
relief, restructure and stimulate the economy, and reform the nation's finan-
cial institutions. Although the administration worked closely with state 
and local governments, political power shifted decisively to the federal 
level. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA), for example, the New Deal's major initial efforts to 
reorganize and revive the economy, imposed sweeping fed(:'ral controls and 
reached extensively into matters of industrial and agricultural production 
that hitherto had seemed both local and private. 
While the conservative orientation of the frderal judiciary clouded 
the future, it S(:'emed possible that the New Deal might proceed with-
out e1Kountering fatal constitutional obstacles. The Taft Court had been 
split between six conservatives and three progressives, but that lineup had 
changed in 191,0 when "fafr and one of his conservative colleagues died. 
Charles Evans Hughes, a relatively progressive Republican, became Chief 
Justice, and the moderate Republican, Owen J Roberts, filled the second 
opening. In the early 19_:;,os the two new justices voted with the three 
progressiv(:'s in a number of critical cases, and they seemed to have tipped 
the judicial balance. The Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to safo-
guard freedom of speech and provide some protection for African Americans 
in Southern state courts, and it gave broad constructions to both the com-
merce power and the category of business "affrcted with a public interest." 
Further, in two sharply divided 5-4 decisions - with both Hughes and 
Roberts joining the Court's three progressives - it recognized the need for 
both state and federal governments to have emergency powers to combat 
the depression. 
If the Hughes Court was different from the "faft Court, however, it 
nonetheless remained committed to enforcing limits on economic regu-
lation by both the states and the federal government. In early I ()~-\5 it inval-
idated a part of the NIH.A and then began a series of rulings - with Roberts 
and sometimes I Iughes joining the four conservatives - that checked state 
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and federal re:gulatory power and, in the process, declared both the AAA and 
the remainder of the NIRA u11co11stitutionaL Invoking the Tenth Amend-
ment to invalidate another New Deal measure, Roberts and the four con-
servatives emphasized that "every addition to the national legislative power 
to some extent detracts frorn or invades the power of the states . .. c, 
While the anti-New Deal majority invoked the idea of fr·deralism, the 
dis,emers often did the same. Illustrating the intrinsically doublc-edi,ed 
nature of the concept, Justice Brandeis, the C:outt's leading progressive, 
deployed 1t to urn.lcrmrne the conservative majority. Excessive centraliza-
tion could flow not only from Congress, he warned in 1 ')-\2, but from the 
fedc:ral judiciary as well. In voiding the reasonable social and econrnnic 
regulations that the states attempted, Brandeis declared, the Court was 
llot exercising "the function of judicial review, but the function of a supcr-
legislature." Jts anti-progressive decisions unwisely restricted the states and 
improperly centralized American government. Moreover, he charged, the 
Court's decisions negated a signal virtue of American frderalism. "It is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory," Brandeis explained, "and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 1-csr of the 
country." Confronted by "an emergency more serious than war," Ameri-
cans had the right to experimem with a variety of possible remedies, and 
the· nat1on's fr·dl'.ral system was de·signnl to allow such diverse and crl'ative 
dforrs. 7 Turning the rabies on the conservative majority, Brandeis used 
his progressive theory of' "experimentalist" federalism ro indict the Court 
itself as a centralizing force that was obstructing the· fedu·,d system's proper 
operation. 
Not surprisingly, the double-edged nature of American fedl'ralism pro-
vided the· Court's anti-progressive majority with a ready response. The 
states could "indul"e in experimental lei..;islat1011 .. Justin· Gcor"c Suther-
land replied for the 7onservat1ve 1rn1Jori ty'. bur thq: c;nild nor "rra:~sccnd the 
limitations imposl'.d upon them by the frderal Constitution." National l11n-
Its existed and controlled, and the Court itself was the institution that iden-
tified and applied those limits. ''The pri11ciple is embedded in our constitu-
tional system," he declared, "that there arc certain essentials of liberty with 
Which the state is not emitled to dispense in the i merest of expcri rnenrs .... , 
Thus, the Supreme Court ~ the ostensible bulwark of fr·deralism ~ once 
r, 
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again suved not as the defender of state autonomy but as an agent of 
national power. 
The Court's anti-New Deal decisions set up one of the most famous 
episodes in its history, the "Constitutional Revolution of r<:)7,7." The stan-
dard tale is familiar and the storyline dramatic. Overwhelmingly reelected 
with crushing Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress, Roosevelt 
stunned the: nation with his proposal to "pack" the Supreme Court by adding 
one new justice, up to a total of six, for every member of the Court over 
the age of seventy. Then, while Congress and the nation debated the plan, 
the: Court suddenly seemed to change its position. In a series of 5-4 deci-
sions - I lughes and Roberts joining the three progressives - it discarded 
the doctrine of liberty of contract and drastically broadened federal pown. 
Over the next few years the Court's four conservatives resigned, and the 
president replaced them with loyal New Dealers who extended the changes 
the Court had begun in the spring of r97,7. 
The traditional story over-inflates the role of the Court-packing plan and 
oversimplifies the processes of constitutional change. The label "revolution," 
moreover, obscures complexities. There was continuity as well as change 
in the Court's decisions, and many of the innovations that occurred had 
roots in earlier periods and witnessed their full flowering only in later 
ones. In spite of the qualifications necessary, however, the traditional story 
highlights a fundamental fact: the New Deal years brought fundamental 
and far-reaching changes to the frderal system. 
First, the New Deal altered the way the system functioned. Centraliz-
ing many arl'as of American life, a dozl'n path-brl'aking measures assl'rted 
nl'w or expancll'd federal authority over the nation's economy and financial 
system. The National Labor Relations Act, for l'xample, which the Court 
upheld under a broadened commerce power, extended federal regulatory 
authority co the employment relationship and guarameed labor the right 
to organize and bargain collcccivcly. The result was the centralization of 
government labor policy, the prl'emption of many state laws considered 
hostile co workl'fs, and che transformation of organized labor inco a nl'wly 
pO\vl'rful and nationalizing force in American politics. Similarly, the Social 
Security Act, which the Court upheld under a broad construction of the 
spending and taxing powers, established t!w institutional foundations for ,1 
limited national welfarl' statl'. The act placl:'d special taxes on workt·rs and 
l'mployl·rs, crl:'atl'd a variety of federal social support programs, and used 
condicional grants to enlist scare participation and impose federal standards 
on their operation. 
In addition, the New Deal moved the federal governnll'llt into a widl'n-
ing range of previously local areas. It establishl'd agencil's to insure indi-
vidual home mortgages and private bank accounts, for example, and it 
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funded a series of massive projects to construct local public facilities and 
provide employmt·nt for millions. Using its power to tax and spend, it pro-
vickd grants to states for a variety of new programs and raised the amounts 
involved into the billions of dollars. The grants extended federal involve-
mc·nt into such previously local areas as employment counseling, health 
care, public housing, conservation, slum clearance, social welfare, and child 
care programs. 
Numbers told much of the story. In 191 :\ state and local governments 
had spent more than twice as much as rhe federal government, bur by 1942 
their spend mg amounted ro barely a quarter of the national total. Federal 
expenditures skyrocketed from less than ',CJ percent to almost 80 percent of 
total government spending in the Un ired States. Similarly, in , 929 frderal 
grants to stare and local agencies had stood at less than $1ou million, but 
after 19 "\'5 they avera,ged more than a billion dollars a year. 
Furrhc·r, rhe New Deal altered the functioning relationship between kd-
lTa] and state governments. As growing fcxleral financing made national 
direction seem, increasingly appr:)priarc.', the fc·deral gove1'.nrnent began to 
expand its administrative capacities and enforce righter and more derailed 
controls over its grants. Some of the condnirn1s it imposed began to reg-
ulate not just spc'.nding hut also the operations of the state ,rnci local go~-
ernnwnt agencies that administered rhe grant programs. Further, rhc rapid 
l'Xpansion of federal-state grant programs began to alter the politics of 
1ntergovernmc11tal relations. It nourished larger bureaucracies at all lcv-
l'!s of government; interrnixed rhe operations and imerests of the fc:deral, 
state, and local officials who administered thu11; and began to create new 
111 terest groups made up of program bc·ncficiaries and their vaned political 
supporters. Still embryonic 111 the late 19yis, those msritutional changes 
Would accelerate in rlw coming decades and i11creasmgly reshape the de 
facto operat1011s of American frderalism. 
The New Deal, moreover, tipped rhe balance of rlw fc:deral system even 
n,ore by expanding the institutional authority of the national executive. 
Roosevelt broadened the power of the presidency by providing a charis-
n,atic image of national leadership, assuming a major role in initiating 
and securing passage of legislation, and by boldly exercising his authority 
to issue executive orders. I k also strengthened the instirutional resources 
of the presidency. Although C:on,gress 1'.efused ro adopt his swt-cpi11,g plan 
to reorganize the cxecmive branch, in 19 )9 it established the nxecutive 
Oflice of the President, providing an expanded sraffand other 1-csources that 
allowed the pres idem to exert greater control over the executive branch and 
to Project his policy decisions more cffrctively. 
The second major chan,ge that the New Deal brought was ro inspire sub-
stantial changes in co11stirutional law that allowed governments at all levels 
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to assert expanded regulatory powers. Most obvious, the post-19) 7 Court 
stretched federal legislative power far beyond its prior limits. In {foi1ecl 
Stales 1'. Darby ( 1 94 r) it overruled Hc1111111er u. Dc1,~enhart and renounced 
the idea that the Tenth Amendment created a substantive barrier against 
national power. The Tenth Amendment, it declared, could never block an 
action chat was otherwise within the constitutional powers of the national 
government. Further, the Court broadened the commerce power to allow 
far-reaching regulation of economic activities. ln the late nineteenth cen-
tury it had held that the "production" of goods was not "commerce" but a 
local activity immune from Congressional reach, and in the early decades of 
the twentieth century it had maintained that distinction while expanding 
the types of local activities that were sufficiently "close" to interstate com-
merce to come within Congressional power. After 1957 it found an ever 
wider range of activities falling within that pow<.'.r, and in 1942 it discarded 
both the close relationship test and the distinction betw<.'.en "production" 
and "comm<.'.rce.'' In \Vickc1rd 11. f,jf/mm ( 1 942) the Court held that Congress 
could r<.'.gulate any activity that - as part oft he agg1Tgate ofal I such activity-
was likdy to hav<.'. some practical <.'.€feet on interstate commerce. llmkr that 
construction the commerce power seemed capable of r<.'.aching almost any-
thing. Finally, going beyond J\las.1uchme/t1 z•. Mellon, the Court construed the 
Taxing, Spending, and General Welfare Clauses with exceptional breadth. 
It held that they constituted independ<.'.nt grants of power, authorized tax-
ing and spending for the broadest purposes of national welfare, and allowed 
the kderal government to make grants to the states contingent on the 
states' acceptance of federal conditions and limitations. Such restrictions, 
the Court ruled, neither coerced the states nor invaded any of their reserved 
rights. 
Similarly, as the international situation grew ominous in the late 1 <J.-1os 
and Roosevelt moved toward a more activist foreign policy, th<: Court 
enhanced tl1<.'. powers of the president over the nation's foreign affairs. Ir 
ruled that the nation's "powers of external sovereignty"'J lay in tlw execmive 
branch, existed independent oft he Constitution, and operated free of restric-
tion from any resc:rved rights of the states. In a striking decision in 1 'J.-17 
it held that the president had authority to make "executive agreements" 
without Senat<.'. approval and that such agreements trumped otherwise valid 
state laws. Thus, as foreign policy emerged as a newly dorninant concern in 
the late 1950s, the expansion of presidential powu· accelerated even motT 
rapidly, bringing larger areas of American ]if<: under federal authority and, 
in an increasingly vital area of national concern, edging the states toward 
the periphery. 
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While constitutional changes during the New Deal years substantially 
expanded federal power, they also broaclen(_'d stat(' regulatory authority. Th(_' 
Courr narrow(_'d its us(' of both federal pr(_'emption a11d rhe n('gat1v(' C:om-
!11('fce Claus(_' to allow stares an expand(_'d role in regulati11g ('Conomic act1v-
iti('s, made stat(' rath('r then f(_'dnal common law controlling in the national 
courrs on issues of stat('-creatcd rights, and in a vari('ty of cases instruct('d 
the lower tl'.deral courts to dcf<-·r to th(' proc(_'(_'dings of state courts and 
administrative ag(_'nci('s. Further, when it abolished the doctrines of~ sub-
stantive du(' procTss and liberty ofcontracr, the C:ourr freed stare· as well as 
federal legislative power. In \\1/est Cot1sl [ [ote! Co. z·. f>drri.,h ( 1 ') 2,7) it over-
ruled Aclkim 1. Chifdrm'.r [lo1jlitt1! and upheld the authority ofsrates to enact 
minimum wage statutes for womt·n, subsra11tially enlarging their gcnnal 
police powers. The stat('S W('re not shy about using th('ir new powns, more-
over, extending th('ir regulatory, service, ancl welfare activities substamially. 
ln 191 :"I state and local gov('rtiments had rais(_'d and sp('nt approximately 
$ I .8 billion, but by the ('arly 1040s the comparable number was five ti mes 
that amount. In addition, one of the most striking, if ind1r('ct, J"(_'sults of 
the New D('a] was th(' adoption in I') 'd of tl1(_' Twenty-First Amendment, 
which rqxaled the Prohibition amendm('Ilt, thereby eliminating a major 
grant of fedu·al authority and restoring pow('r to the states. 
The third major change that the New D(_'al brought was the transfor-
mation of th(' rederal judiuary. Roos('vclt restaffed th(' lower courts with 
appointees sympath('tic to his policies, and b('tW('l'n 1 <J.'>7 and 1 ').J"\ he 
reoril·11ted tlw Suprcm(_' Court by filling scv('n of its scats with adminis-
tration loyalists. The n(_'w judg('s, in turn, began to r('shapc f(_'deral law 111 
line with the goals and values of the New Deal. Some rnaintainnl that they 
Were merely casting off crabbed doctrinal accrnions from the larc n111t·-
teenth C('lltury and !"('Storing the expansive constirntional principles that 
the Found('rs had originally intended. Others hega11 to articulate a new 
attitude toward constitutional law. Th(_'y advanced the idea thar rhe ( :onst i-
tution was a flexible, practical, and even "living" i11strun1ent. The Founders 
had used broad and adaptive t('rms, they argued, so that Americans would 
be able to respond etfrctively to future problems as the changing d(_'mands 
of th(_'ir well-b(_'ing required. 
Drawing on those ideas and th('ir New Deal sympathies, frd(_'ral judges 
bt\~an to infuse new meanings into the constirntional ideals of libnry .llld 
l'l]Uality. They began to give incr(_'ased protection to the kinds of"11nso11,d" 
liberties that they believed all individuals should enjoy in a democratil 
society while downgrading tht· economic 11 b('rties rhat accrued, as a practical 
1natter, pri rnarily to the benefit of large corporat 1011s and the ec01mm ical ly 
Powerful. Further, th('y sou,~l1t to move beyond mere ft>rmal lc,~,d equality 
and nourish ,l greater practical equality by showing, often though surely 
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not invariably, a special solicitude to individuals and groups that were weak 
or disadvantaged - African Americans, workers, consumers, labor unions, 
political dissenters, victims of industrial injury, and unpopular ethnic and 
religious minorities. 
Hal tingly and somewhat erratically, the post-19 _::17 Court floated a variety 
of constitutional theories to justify its shifting social orientation, including 
the idea that the Constitution required it to provide special protection for 
rights that were "vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions" or 
that were so "fundamental" as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty."''' Although the Court did not consistently apply any single theory, 
one of those it suggested would - decades later and in the wake of the Warren 
Court - become particularly influential. When normal democratic political 
processes were working and citizens had fair opportunities to influence their 
governments, five justices declared in U11ited Stc1tes z;. C{tro!ene Prod11cts Co. 
( r 9 )8), the Court should defer to decisions of the political branches. Con-
versely, when normal democratic processes were blocked or when they led 
to systemic abuses against helpless minorities, the Court should intervene 
to runedy the situation. Translating theory into doctrine, Carolene Prod11cts 
suggested that judicial review should operate on two tracks. When the 
Court reviewed ordinary economic regulations that resulted from normal 
political competition and compromise, it would apply a "rational basis" 
test, upholding government action if the action bore a reasonable relation 
to some legitimate government end. When, however, it reviewed cases 
involving the denial of fundamental non-economic rights or discrimina-
tio11 against "discrete and insular mi11oricies" -situations in which ordinary 
democratic processes had failed to work properly - the Court would apply 
a "stricter scrutiny," an inquiry that would validate government actions 
only on a showing chat the actions were narrowly tailored and essential to 
achieve a compelling governmental goal.'' 
Regardless of its varied justifications and sometimes contradictory rul-
ings, the post-19."7 Court was proposing itself as the protector of abused 
individuals and minorities, and, in so doing, it was also turning away 
from its earlier role as umpire of the federal system. On the ground chat fair 
democratic politics should ordinarily prevail and that the legislative branch 
represented the states as well as the people, it accepted the principle that 
Congress was ordinarily the proper institution to determine whether and to 
what extent federal power should be exercised. Similarly, on the ground that 
the president had vast authority and discretion in the conduct of foreign 
' '.\'il!//cidcr,: /n i11,~/1!//, ;11!-, l I .S. I 17. 1 G 1 ( 1 ') \<)); /',i/ko /'. Co1111cc1im1, .\02 { l.S .. \ 1 '), \2'5 
( 19,S). 
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relations, it increasingly deferred to executive decisions that implicated for-
eign policy concerns. The altered role the Court sketched would help define 
the triple tracks of governmental centralization that marked the years after 
r 93 7. In economic matters Congress would exercise sweeping national kg-
islarive authority; in foreign pol icy matters the president would exercise 
an ever-growing and often uncl1ecked executive discretion; and in certain 
areas involving non-economic social and political rights the Court would 
come to assert an expanding national judicial authority. 
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World War II and the dominating events that followed - the· birth of the 
nuclear age, the 011set of the Cold War, and the crncrge11ce of the United 
States as the undisputed leader of"the f1-ce world" - reinforced rhe nation-
alizing trend that the Depression, the New Deal, and the nation's long-
accelerating econom 1c and cultural centralization had forged. The war led 
to massive expansions in the federal bureaucracy, swecpi ng national controls 
over the domestic economy, and the induction of more than 1 (i mill ion rne11 
and women into the armed forces. The Cold War that followed sustained 
the national mobilization, generated a pervasive anri-C:ornmunisrn that fur-
ther homogenized and centralized politirnl debate, and provided a national 
security justification for growing federal inrrus1ons imo areas pITv1ously left 
to the states. Turning the nation from its traditio11al and relatively aloof 
foreign policy, the war and Cold War transformed the United Scates inro 
a global military and economic superpower at least porenrially interested 
111 even the smallest and most distant regions of the world. The 11ower and 
activities of the federal government grew apace, and the role of the presi-
dency, in parncular, continued to swell. The National Security An of 1947 
established both the National Sernrity Council a11d the C:enrral lnrelligence 
Agency as powerful a11d wel !-funded agencies of the executive hra11ch, and 
the:- White House staff, which numbered 61 people at the e11d of World 
War II, jumped to ',')') by I ')'57 and then to 48<; only six year later. All 
extended the presidenr's ability to comrol and enforce 11ario11al policy a11d ro 
shape the contours of the 11atio11's donwst,c political debates. The escalating 
foreign policy challenges, moreover, induced the C:ourr to adopt a highly 
deferential attitude toward both Congress and the presidc11t, temporarily 
checking its proclaimed 11ew comrnitmellt to protect civil liberties. During 
the war the C:ourr refused to challenp;e the army's decision ro place more 
than a hu11dred thousa11d Jap,.:1ese-Americans in co11ce11rrat1011 camps, and 
into the 1950s it failed to protect the civil liberties of many of those who 
ran afoul of the second Red Scare that erupted in the early years of the 
Cold War. 
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Ahhough postwar politics grew more conservative, the major achieve-
ments of the New Deal remained largely in place. Harsh memories of the 
Great Depression, the unprecedented efforts of the Roosevelt administration 
to alleviate the nation's ills, and the stunning and sustained economic boom 
that followed wartime mobilization combined to inspire a broad new con-
sensus. Americans had come to believe that many of the pressing difficulties 
they faced were "social" in nature, not "individual,'' and that government 
could and should take a more active role in resolving them. Indeed, their 
acceptance of the idea that a newly muscular federal government was neces-
sary to protect national security in the Cold War strengthened their belief 
that the same national government cou Id also act as an effective instru-
ment of rational, democratic problem solving at home. Increasingly, they 
looked to government at all levels for an expanding variety of services. Most 
immediately, they had rnnw to Lx:lieve that anything affecting the Ameri-
can economy was properly a national issue for which the federal government 
should rake responsibility. Sustaining economic growth and ensuring full 
employment became domestic goals of the highest priority, and Americans 
assumed that one of the primary duties of the federal government was to 
underwrite the nation's continuing economic welfare. Accordingly, govern-
ment at all levels grew, and the federal government expanded most rapidly. 
With its unparalleled capacity for raising funds through tl1e national income 
tax, and the distinct advantages its members realized from dispensing pub-
lic money, Congress proved increasingly ready to finance new programs and 
expand old ones. Funds allocated to regular domestic grant programs, for 
example, doubled in only the first two years after the war. 
Although the Republicans controlled <if one or both Houses of Congress 
as well as the presidency for much of the period from r 94 6 to r 960, they 
gradually acceded to most New Deal reforms and even joined in expanding 
the activities of the federal government. Congress passed new public hous-
ing, urban redevelopment, and minimum wage legislation, and it expanded 
federal spending programs to enlarge Social Security, guarantee opportuni-
ties for returning veterans, and provide funding for education, conservation, 
hospital construction, scientific research, and rural electrification. During 
the presidency of Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower from 19'd to 1961, 
federal aid to states on a per capita basis more than doubled. The sys-
tem of "dual federalism" had passed away, replaced by one of "cooperative 
federalism" in which governments at all levels participated in a widening 
variety of joim programs and dealt with national problems by blending 
federal funding and direction with state· and local administration. lllus-
trating both the spread of cooperative fi:deralism and the ways in which 
Cold War national defense concerns fostered the expansion of the national 
government, Republicans and Democrats joined forces in r 956 to pass the 
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Interstate I I ighway Act. The measure provided massive federal funding for 
the construction ofa 40,000-rnile interstate highway system that promised 
to benC:fit a wide range of groups and interests across the nation. The states 
supported it enthusiastically, and Congress easily justified it as necessary 
for national defense. 
lndeed, the extent to which the federal system, and normative theo-
ries about it, had evolved became apparenr rather quickly. Between H)47 
and 1959 Republicans and other supporters of states'-rights ideas initi-
ated four major efforts ro study the fc:dcral system and find ways to check 
and t'l've,rse the trend toward centralization. None had a noticeable impact. 
During his presidency, Eisenhower sponsored two such efforts. In r 95 7, for 
e·xamplc, he urged the creation ofa special govcrnmcm task force designed 
"to designate functions which the, States arc ready and willing to assume 
and finance that arc now performed or financed wholly or i11 part by the 
Federal Covt'rnme'nt." 12 'fo accomplish that end, he cooperated with the 
National Governors Conference 111 establishing a.Joint Federal-State· Action 
Committee composed of officials from the highest ranks of state and kderal 
government. After an elaborate and well-financed study, the com mi ttt'e was 
ablt' to identify only two programs - vocational t'ducation and municipal 
Waste treatmt'nt - that should be transfc:rrnl from fi:dt"ral to state conrrol. 
lrlgethcr, the two programs accounted for a barely notict"able 2 percent 
of total frderal grants to stat<:' and local governments. While a variety of 
political and economic factors conspired to trivialize the committet''s con-
clusions, its much-heralded effort revealed 011e overpowering fan. By the 
1 ':ls;os a complex system of nationally directed and ti.1nded cooperative frd-
l:ralism had been firmly established and was becomin,t; widely accepted in 
both theory and practice. 
While some conservatives still hoped to restore a rr101T decentralized 
system, liberals worked to shape the operations of the new order to their 
purposes. If national power had been drastically expanded and federalism 
transformed into a '·cooperative" system, they reasoned, then the Supreme 
Courr requirt'd a new institutional role adapted ro those new conditions. 
Tht' horrifying brutalities of Nazi and Soviet rotal1tarian1sm inspired an 
intensified commitment to the idea of the rule of law, and the tumultuous 
Cold War campaigns against Communism heightened tllt'ir belief that the 
nation needed a strong judiciary ro protect individual liht"rtics. Further, 
the growing conservatism of the states in economic matters, their enthu-
siasm for fighting Communism by restricting civil liberties, and - most 
1, 
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crucially ~ the adamant determination of those in the South to preserve 
racial segregation combined to cast a new and unflattering light on the idea 
that the states were democratic laboratorie~; that should be free to conduct 
social experiments. Indeed, in the postwar years the very term "social exper-
iment" raised images not of beneficent progressive reforms but of Nazi death 
chambers and Stalinist labor camps. Increasingly, Democrats and liberals 
turned to the reoriented post-New Deal foderal judiciary as the government 
institution most likely to enfi:irce national rules that would serve their new 
values, interests, and aspirations. 
One of the most thoughtful, and eventually influential, fi_lrmulations 
of those liberal attitudes came from Herbert Wechsler, a prominent legal 
scholar and old New Dealer. The normative constitutional problem that 
postwar liberals faced, Wechsler explained, was to find a principled way 
to "defend a judicial veto" when used to protect "personal freedom," but 
to "condemn it" when used to block government actions '·necessary for 
the decent humanization of American capitalism."'' In !<)54 Wechsler 
suggested an elegant solution. The Constitution itself guaranteed statt: 
sovereignty by providing the states "a role of great importance in the com-
position and selection of the central government." Those "political safe-
guards of federalism" included equal state representation in the Senate, 
control over many aspects of voting and districting for the House, and a 
key role in electing the president through the system of electoral votes. 
Thus, the very structure of the Constitution meant that Congress and the 
president would "be responsive to local values that have large support within 
the states." Consequently, there was 110 need for tht: Court to protect the 
states or to serve as the umpire of federalism. Instead, the constitutional 
structure suggested that the Court should focus its efforts elsewhere. First, 
because the federal government had no part in composing the state govern-
ments, it was the federal government, not the states, that needed the Court's 
protection. Thus, the Court should ensure "the maintenance of national 
supremacy against nullification or usurpation by the individual states." 
Second, because the Constitution's majoritarian "political processes" would 
not remedy popular and democratic abuses against disfavored minorities, 
the Court should enforce "those constitutional restraints on Congress or 
the states that are designed to safeguard individuals."' 1 Thus, post-New 
Deal liberalism began to develop the id<::a that Caro/me Prod11cts had voiced: 
'' Nor111a11 Sil her and Ccolfrcy Milkr, "'\i,ward 'Nl"utral P1·i11ripks' i11 thl' Law: Sclr·ctiom 
from t hc- ( lra\ 11 isrory of I lnl)L"rt \l(/ech,lcr," Col///11Ui<1 l,d/1' l?c-1 ·irn· <); ( 1 99, ), 8c,.1, 92.1. 
' 1 1 icrbcrt Wech,lcr, 'The Poli rim\ Salc·guards of Fnll"ralisrn: The Role of the Sratl's in 
the Composition and Sclc-crion of thc- National (;ovc·rnrnent," Col///11hi<1 /,,111· i<,·1·ic11· 'j.\ 
(1,Jc;.1), 'i,U, 'i'il, 'i'i9, c;(,o, 11. 'i9 
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the Constitution underwrote the principle that the Court should protect 
abused individuals and helpless minorities, not the already powerful states 
or the well-entrenched federal system. 
In the postwar years the most systematically disadvantaged minority in 
the United Scates was African Americans, and a variety of factors pushed 
the Court to take action on their behalf Some were internal: a frw useful 
precedents, the spread of post-New Deal liberal values, the justification 
provided by the Cr1mlene Prod!lllJ idea, and key changes in the Court's per-
sonnel - especially the appo1 ntrnent in 1 95 ', of Earl Warren as Ch1ef.J ustice. 
Others were external. The African American community had bee11 leaving 
the South, developing a strong middle class, increasing in organization 
and militancy, and .~aining political influence in the North. Further, the 
atrocities of Nazi c;ermany had discred 1 ted racist ideas, and the C:old \'var 
rnade repudiation of racism necessary to counter Soviet efforts ro umlerm 111e 
American influence in the Third World. The Democratic Party, roo, had 
been transformed since the New Deal. Incrcaslllgly urban, northern, 1 iberaL 
and reliant on African American votes, it was ready to support meaningful 
efforts to end racial oppression. Finally, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People was pressing a methodical legal campa(~n 
against racial segregation, and its dforts presented a series ofwcll-desigm·d 
constitutional challenges that allowed the Court to chip away at legalized 
racial segre.~ation. To.~ethcr, the changc"S highlighted the discordant nature 
of Southern raual practices, led increasing numbers of Americans to rejecr 
them, and helped install 111 tlw fl'deral courts Judges syrnpatlwtic ro the 
cause of racial equality. 
The judicial turning point came in 1954 when rhe Court ruled in /lro11·11 
1'· l3ollrd 11/ l!d11cc1tio11 (1954) that racial segregation in the public schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause and then, over the next li:w years, 
cxtended its ruling to a variety of other public institutions and facilities. 
Exemplifying and dramatizing the idea of the rc:deral judiuary as the pro-
tector of both fundamental non-economic rights and "discrete and insular 
minorities," the decisions asserted national authority over rhe stares in a 
crucial area of social policy, one that had been labeled "local" si nee the end 
of Reconstruction. When Southern state governments and private citi/u1s· 
groups pledged massive resistance ro Bro11·11, the Court responded in 1958 
With an extraordinary assertion of national judicial supremacy signed by all 
nine justices. "[T}he frdcral judiciary is supreme in the exposition of rlw 
law of the Constitution," they proclaimed 111 C1111/Jc/' r. 1L11·011, and "the imer-
pretation of rhe Fourteenth Amendment enunciatnl by this Courr Ill thL· 
l3rrJ11'11 case 1s the supreme law of the land."''' The decisions strengthennl 
,, 
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a galvanizing civil rights movement, but they also provoked bitter and 
sometimes violent opposition. By themselves they were unable to end 
racial segregation in the South. That bad to await events of tbe following 
decade. 
/3ro11?1 and the civil rights struggle helped fire the tumultuous era known 
as ''the sixties," a politico-cultural phenomenon that began sometime after 
r 95 7, became self-conscious in thl'. rnrly r 960s, peaked between r 965 and 
1972, and expired rapidly after 1974. Underlying social developments - a 
sustained economic boom, rapid expansion and luxurious federal support 
of higher education, the emergence of experimental "youth cultures" and 
radical "liberation" movements, and the popularization of social theories 
that challengcd traditional idcas across tl1l'. board - combined to spur major 
changes in American attitudes and values. Melding with escalating and 
disruptive protests against an ev<:r widening and seemingly futile war in 
Vietnam, the changes generatcd a volatile era of turmoil and transformation, 
of vaulting hopes and intensifying hatcs. 
With respect to the: frderal system, the: sixti<:s initially accelerated 
the trend toward centralization. Democratic President .John F. Kennedy 
inspired a new cnthusiasm for liberal activism after his election in I 960, 
and his successor Lyndon H. Johnson strove to build a "Great Society," one in 
which the frderal government would achieve the social and economic goals 
of the New Deal and ensure that all Americans shared in their benefits. The 
Supreme Court became increasingly active in imposing liberal national 
standards on the states, and aftcr an overwhelming Democratic victory in 
1 sl>4, Congress responded with a series of major domestic reforms. Furthcr, 
between 1 9(i 1 to 1971 the: nation ratified four constitutional amendments, 
three of which protected the right of Americans to vote, limiting state 
authority and giving Congrl'.ss power to enforce their mandates. 
Of most cnduring importance, the federal government as a whole finally 
committed itself to the cause of black civil rights. Kennedy and Johnson 
increasingly embraced the issue, and between 1964 and 1968 Congrc:ss 
passed three monumental civil rights acts. Two broadly prohibited racial 
and other types of discrimination in housing, education, employment, and 
"public accommodations." The third negatl'.d a wide range oflegal and prac-
ticil obstacles that Southern states deploycd to dcny African Americans the 
franchise. Equally important, the statutes created effective remedies for vio-
lations and made the federal govcrnment an activl'. and continuous agent of 
enforccmem. Illustrating the relatively consistent purpose that animated 
thc entire fi.:deral govcrnment in the late 1960s, the executive branch imme-
diately initiated or expanded a variety of programs to enforce thc new civil 
rights statutes, wh ilc the Supreme Court quickly upheld their constitution-
ality. Ir approved the sharply challenged public accommodations provision 
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by applying the sweeping interpretation of the Commerce Clause advanced 
in Wickard v. Piib11m, and it validated federal control over voting rights on 
the ground that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Anwmlment gave Congress the 
broadest possible power necessary to enforce the amendment's rights. By 
the end of the r96os legalized segregation was crumbling, a11d the constitu-
tional pillar of post-Reconstruction frderalism that had survived tlw New 
Deal~ the principle that racial matters were local~ had been obliterated. 
Congress expanded frderal authority in orlll'r areas as wdl. .Johnson's 
Great Society reached into the backwaters of American life, ide11tifyi11g the 
very existence of poverty and inequality as problems of national importance. 
Like the theory of Cc1mle11e Pmd11cls and the concerted attack on racial dis-
crimination, his War on Poverty sought to assist the nation's poorest groups 
and remedy fundamental strucrnral inequalities. Congress aurhorized ever 
more generous grants to state and local governments for a seemingly lin1-
itlc:ss variety of "categorical" purposes, including welfare, housing, child 
care, mass transit, job training, education, urban renewal, medical insur-
ance, and legal services for the poor. Similarly, the federal governmellt began 
a concerted effort to deal with issues of environmental pollution and the 
conservation of natural resources. Increasingly, moreover, the new programs 
Were intended not merely to help state and local governments deal with their 
])roblems but to implement national policies designed to achieve national 
objectives. 
A report of the federal Advisory Commission on lntcrgovernrnenral Rela-
tions published in 1 967 charred the steady and accderat1ng expansion of 
federal funding programs. Before 19Yl the national governnwm offrrnl 
funding to state and local governments in only ten areas of activity. The 
New Deal brought federal funding ro seventeen more areas, and the early 
Postwar years added another twenty-nine to the list. The period from 1961 
to r9(i6, however, witnessed the most explosive growth. New programs 
extended federal fi.111ding to another thirty-nine areas ofswte and local ,~ov-
ernment activity -- an increase of almost 70 percent in only six years. Thus, 
by r9Ci7 the fi::deral government was funding state and local government 
activities in 95 areas and doing so through 2,79 separate categorical grant 
j)rograms. In a decade, total ft.:deral aid ro state and local governments 
tripled, rismg from $4.9 billion in 1958 to ~15.2 billion in 1967. 
The political momentum carried into the next decade. Even under 
Republican President Richard M. Nixon, who talked abour a "new i"eder-
alisn1" that would return power to the states, national activism continued. 
Indeed, in the first two years of his administration federal funding to stare 
,ind local govc0 rnments jumped by more than a rhml, reaching $25 billion 
111 1970. Through a variery of changes within tlw executive branch, Nixon 
enhanced presidemial power to manage both the fr.dcral bureaucracy and 
Edward A. P 11rcel! . .Jr. 
the distribution of funds to the states. He sought not so much to limit 
federal power and government activism as to make all government agencies 
more streamlined and efficient. Moreover, stressing the problem of "crime 
in the streets" and the need frir "law and order," he accelerated the use of the 
national government to fight crime, particularly "organized" crime and nar-
cotics trafficking. New legislation expanded the scope of the federal criminal 
law, turned a multiplying number of state-law crimes into federal violations, 
and in the Racketeer I nf-luencecl and Corrupt Organizations Act ( r 970) gave 
the national government muscular new tools to investi
0
,;ate and prose-
cute transgressors. Similarly, the decade brought major federal initiatives 
aimed at protecting the environment and expanding government wel-
fare services. Although some social programs, particularly those involving 
Johnson's War on Poverty, were crimped or terminated, many others took 
their place. During the decade total federal spending on welfare programs 
more than doubled. By r979 Congress had established more than five hun-
dred grant programs that accounted for a third of the federal budget and 
furnished state and local governments with approximately 1,0 percent of 
their total revenue. Nforeover, although lZepublicans criticized many aspects 
of the civil rights movement, especially school busing, affirmative action, 
and some aspects of anti-discrimination law, the party~ or at least its North-
ern wing~ accepted many of the changes the movement had brought. 
As federal fu11di11g gushed forth, the national government's control over 
its programs continued to tighten. Although Nixon sought to minimize fed-
eral restrictions through uncond i tio11al "revenue sharing" and less restrictive 
"block grants," his efforts were only minimally successful. Federal agencies 
swelled in number and responsibilities, while the scope and rnmpkxity of 
their regulations multiplied geometrically. Expanding and reorganizing the 
federal bureaucracy, for example, Congress established the Departments of 
Housing and Urban Development ( 1 965), Transportation ( r 966), Energy 
( 1 977 ), and Education ( 1 979), as well as the Environmental Protection 
Agency ( 1970), to help administer some of its new programs. The agen-
cies spawned a growing body of regulations that ranged from detailed 
rules controlling individual categorical programs to broad across-the-board 
rules covering many or all grant programs. Increasingly, moreover, federal 
regulations sought to serve a variety of national policies ~ ending dis-
crimination, protecting tlw environment, expanding opportunities fcir the 
disadvantaged ~ unrelated to specific grant programs themselves. During 
the 1 970s the total number of federal regulations more than doubled, and 
Congress and the federal bureaucracy were increasingly regulating not just 
the distribution of funds but the policies and operations of state and local 
governments themselves. 
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~rowtl1 of kderal activism was driven in large part by 
three fundamental changes in the political system. One was the increasing 
centralization that marked al I areas of American public lifi:_• and transformed 
ever larger numbers of issues imo matters of national concern. The acceler-
ating nationalization and internationalization or economic enterprise, the 
dramatic and unifying power of ever mon: pervasive mass media, the grow-
ing case and speed of travel, and the frequency with which Americans moved 
their homes from state to sratl' and region to region combined to homogenize 
Amnican I ife and cul rure, a11d the atti rnd i nal changes that resul red increas-
ingly made most problems seem national 1n scope and resolvable only with 
national solutions. Moreover, the ever-tightening tyra11ny of money in the 
political process magnified the influence: of those private organizations -
almost always national in operation and concern - that werl' capable of 
providing the huge campaign donations that the political parties required. 
Those organizations -corporations, labor unions, industrial and profrssional 
associations, and swelling varieties of ideological advocacy groups - almost 
invariably sought, in return for their support, national policy decisions that 
Would provide thc,m with advantages national in scope. 
Tl1c second change lay in the new a11d stronger sets of interlocking local, 
state, and national interests that resulted from the, massive federal spl'ndi11g 
programs of the prior decadl's. The programs were attractive to members of 
Congress who found them ideal ways to shape policy while assisting their 
favored interest groups, furnwling money to their districts, and improv-
ing rlteir chances of reelection. Further, the programs developed their own 
Powerful constituencies: grant recipiems and the interest groups who sup-
ported them; professionals who designed and adminisrnul the programs; 
and i1rnumcrablc ofliuals at all levels of government who for reasons of 
public policy, bureaucratic i11flucncc, and personal advancement found the 
programs highly desirable. As fr·deral spending grew, so did the power of 
those imcrlocking interests, and they continued to drive expanded frdcral 
~pending in the 1970s even as the animating values of post-New Deal 
liberalism were withering. 
The third change was rooted in the altered role of the presidency in 
an age of mass communications and cultural ce11tralization. Dominating 
national politics and the public agenda, presidents - and all serious can-
didates for the office - found it essential to propose national solutions for 
almost every problu11 that drew national attention. By the late rwcmicrh 
cenrury American presidents were expected to act 110t only as chief execu-
tives and commandcrs-in-chiefbut also as legislative leaders and all-purpose 
national problem solvers. The nation's seemingly limitless demands 011 the 
office magnified its irresistibly ccmripetal f,:irce. 
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While Congress, the executive, and concentrating social pressures were 
extending foderal power, the Supreme Court was doing the same. Begin-
ning in the early 1 960s, the Warren Court launched a new and broader 
phase ofliberal activism. Shifted leftward by the retirement of two conser-
vatives - including .Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court's leading advocate 
of "judicial restraint" and deference to tlw states - and galvanized by the 
reformist nationalism of Warren and Justice William_). Brennan, a new 
majority coalesced in almost perfect harmony with the decade's vibrant 
liberal politics. Between r 962 and 1 969 the Court expanded its efforts 
far beyond civil rights and announced a breathtaking series of decisions 
that imposed federal limitations on the states in a variety of areas. Perhaps 
of greatest institutional importance, the Court asserted national authority 
over the districting and apportionment of state and local legislative bod-
ies. Rejecting earlier decisions, it ruled that the Equal Protection Clause 
required that electoral districts have closely comparable populations based 
on the egalitarian standard of "one person, one vote."' 6 
Similarly, the Court substantially expanded the reach of the First Amend-
ment. Construing the amendment's religion clauses, it prohibited a variety 
of government-sponsored religious practices, ruling that states could not 
require officeholders to declare their belief in God, sponsor Bible reading 
as part of the public school curriculum, or compel schoolchildren to recite 
compulsory prayers. Construing the Free Speech Clause, it ruled that tlw 
states could punish advocacy only if a person's words were specifically cal-
culated to incite imminent unlawful actions, and it held that the right of 
free speech created a qualified privilege against state defamation suits, a 
decision that not only limited state law but opened the way for particularly 
vigorous criticism of state and local officials. Perhaps most innovative, in 
Grisll'ofd 1: C()/meclimt ( 1965) it held that the First Amendment, in rnniunc-
tion with other amendments, created a constitutional right of privacy that 
barred states from prohibiting residents from using or conveying inform,1-
tion about contraceptives. 
Equally controversial, the Warren Court applied most of the rest of the 
Bill of Rights to the states. Again reversing prior doctrine, it held that the 
cemral provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were 
"incorporated" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteemh Amendment. 
Moreover, it repeatedly broadened the protections that the clauses offered. 
In what was probably its most controversial decision in the area, 1\lir,mclt1 
11. 1\ri:umc1 (19(16), it required law enforcement agents to inform artTstL·es 
about their constitutional rights and to respect their decision to exercise 
those rights. 'fo enforce its rulings, the Court expanded the availability of 
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federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, enabling the lower federal judiuary 
to review state court criminal convictions more frequently. The decisions 
created, in effect, an expanding federal code of criminal procedure that 
bound the states, restrained police behavior across the nation, and provoked 
bitter and widespread criticism. 
As Congressional activism continued into the 1970s, so did the Court's. 
Although Ch iefJ ustice Warren resigned in 1 969 a11d Nixon appo1 nred four 
new justices, including the new chic.f justice, \Xlarren E. But),cr, the Court 
changed less than many expected. Indeed, i11 several areas it cominued to 
extend frxleral power, making the early Buri~l'I' Court seem almost a third, 
if sonwwhar ambivalent, phase of the \Xlarren Court. During the 1970s 
the Burger Court gave constirunonal sanction ro some types of affirma-
tive action, confirmed the broad power of Congress under the FourtL'Ctlth 
Anwndment, and upheld a substamial, if limited, 1-cmed1al aurllOrity in 
the federal courts to ordcr local officials to inregrate previously segregated 
public school districts. In addition, it provided due prncL·ss protections 
for w<:-Jfare recipients faced with termination ofbendirs and conrinuL·d the 
Warren Court's efforts to expand the relic{ that injured individuals rnuld 
obtain under a variuy of federal regulatory statutes. 
In three areas the Burger Court's decisions seemed particularly liberal, 
activist, and nationalist. Firsr, it held rh,lt the Equal Protection Clause 
applit·d to gender classifications. Congress had hegu11 to address gender 
• (_ (_ ( < 
1nec1ualiry in the 1960s, and in 197 1 the Court ruled in /?m/ I'. /?.m/ thar 
a state stature disfavoring wornen violated the Constitution. Second, reaf-
firming and broade11ing ;he constitutional right or privacy that rhe Warren 
Court had p1om·cred in (,'n.111'olcl, it held rhar the right barred stares i'ro111 
Prohibiting the sale of comraceptives ro unmarried persons ,u1d, for more 
innovative and comrovcrsial, atmounced in Noe!'. \Vi1clc ( 197 )) that it ,L'.uar-
antecd women the right to an abortion. The Burger Courr thus co11firmcd 
that a 11ew and vibrant "public/private" distinction had L'lltLTed Ameri-
can constirntional law. Unlike the pre-New Deal Court, which had used 
the distinction to protect property and economic lihnty from ,govcrnlllL'llt 
regulation, however, the Warren and Burger Courts infused new rneani11g 
into the dichotomy, usin,g it to protect intimate matters involvi11g sex and 
\)rocreation from such imerfi.:rence. Finally, the BurgLT Court cxtendl'll the 
reach of the Eighth Amendment, mandating rnrnimum fnkral standards 
on horh capital pu11ishment a11d prison com I 1tio11s. I ts ru Ii ngs pt-cvemnl 
tht• statL·s from executin,g hundreds of condem11nl prisonns, forced rhem 
to make substantial revisions in their criminal laws, and compclll'll rhc111 
to institute a variL·ty of reforms in the administration of' rill'1r correct ions 
s_Ystcrns. By the 1980s more than 200 stare prisons and ,-\ 'JO local jai Is in 
forty-three states were operating undn federal court orders. 
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The growing control that the federal courts exercised over the nation's 
prisons was only one of the more visible areas in which federal judicial super-
vision cabined the power of state and local officials. After I3roun the frclernl 
courts had gradually taken over hundreds of schools in their efforts to ensure 
that the Court's mandate was enforced. Inspired by their role in combating 
racial segregation and energized by a burgeoning faith in the judiciary's 
power to redress social wrongs, the frderal courts grew increasingly willing 
to rake 011 broader and more complex social problems. Moreover, the explo-
sion of Congressional legislation compelled them in the same direction. 
Numerous statures created new and sometimes vague rights under many 
of the cooperative programs that the federal government funded, and those 
provisions spurred a rapidly expanding range of suits in the national courts 
against state and local governments. Increasingly, federal judges became 
active managers of ongoing litigations that sought to reform the srruc-
tutTs and procedures of those governments, and they often issued derniled 
orders establishing federal rules over many areas that Congressional funding 
had brought within the indirect, but nevertheless effective, control of the 
national government. 
Although national law and national standards had become pervasive by 
the 1 970s, the states nevertheless remained vital centers of power. For the 
most part, their laws still controlled many of the most basic areas of Amer-
ican life: marriage, family, education, criminal justice, commercial trans-
actions, zoning and land usage, estate planning and inheritance, the use of 
automobiles and the highways, and most of the broad common law fields 
of rort, contract, and property. Indeed, in lawsuits where state law prop-
erly controlled, fr·deral constitutional law continued to bind the nariornd 
courts to follow and apply it. State and local governments, moreover, were 
heavily involved in providing most services in such basic areas as eduu1-
tion, transportation, social welfare, police and public protection, housing 
and developmental planning, natural resource conservation and usage, and 
labor relations and employmellt practices. While from 1 950 to I 97 5 the 
number of federal civilian employees edged up from 2.1 to 2.9 million, 
the number of state and local government employees jumped from 4.2 to 
1 2 mil lion, almost 60 percent of whom were concentrated in the fields of 
education and health services. 
Furrher, stimulated by the federal government's expanded activism, 
local reformers pushed to modem ize state governments and enhance their 
administrative capacities. Liberals sought to strengthen their ability to pro-
vide greater ranges of social services, while many conservatives hoped that 
stronger state governments would help check the increasing nationaliza-
tion rhar marked the post-New Deal decades. From the 1940s through 
the 197m the states increased their use of professional administrators and 
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drafted expert commissions to frame co11stitutional amendrnu1ts and other 
structural reforms that would strengthen the insritutio11s of state govern-
ment. In r 962 only twenty states held annual legislative sessions, for exam-
ple, bur by the mid r 970s forty-two did so. Influenced by rhe growi11g 
emphasis on executive leadership that marked the 11acio11al model, sixteen 
States exte11ded gubernatorial rerrns to four years, and a doze11 eliminated 
long-established restrictions to allow their ,governors ro serve a second suc-
cessive term. Further, 11i11etee11 states resrrucrurnl their entire l'Xecurive 
branches, expanding gubernatorial powers over a varil·ty of budgetary mar-
te rs and giving their governors greater administrative comrol over a wide 
range of state and local agencies. Moreover, stare employmem, revenues, 
and cxpendirnres generally expanded relative to those of. local governmem 
entities, and most states cemralized their administrations by irnposi11g 
a growing number of requirements and restrictions 011 local government 
institutions. 
Finally, states and localities were able to protect their positio11s in the 
federal system by exerting persistent and dk·nive pressures 011 the national 
government. They marshaled their power by establishing a variety oforga-
ni:wrions - i11cluding the National Covernors· Assouation, the National 
Conference of State I~egislarntTs, the National League of Cities, the lJ.S. 
Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of· Counties - to influ-
ence federal policy and e11sure that national programs were railornl to 
local needs and interests. Further, by administermg many cooperative srare-
tederal programs, they were able to help shape their operations and impact. 
The states, too, retained substantial imkpcndence in thl'ir actions bnause 
their officials continul'd to be elected directly by thl'ir cirizrns and derived 
neitlwr office nor authority from rhe national governmem. While thl' states 
helped elect ft0 deral officials, thl' fr·dl'ral govcrnrnl'llt lwd 110 such role in 
State electoral processes. 
IV. RESIIAPINC; FEDFRALISM IN AN AC;E 01· 
FRACMFNTATION AND RFALICNMENT: VFC:TORS 
OF AN lJNH)Ll)IN(; ERA, 1 ')7os 2"ri,, 
1'lk 1960s ended badly for post-New Deal liberalism. Escalating mili-
tancy in the civil rights and antiwar movemellts brought mass protests and 
civil disobedience ro the center of American politics, while the appearance 
of communes, youth cultures, fi:mmism, sexual f'reedom, gay lilwration, 
black nationalism, and varieties of· political radicalism f'ucled a growing 
backlash among older and more conservative Arnerirnns. Three stunning 
Political assassinations - Presidenr Kennedy; his brother, Robert, a senator 
and Democratic presidential candidate; and Dr. Martin Luther King, .Jr., 
Edward A. P11rcel!,Jr. 
the rev<:Ted and despised leader of the civil rights movement - compounded 
a growing sense of turmoil, division, and crisis. 
The events fragmented post-New Deal liberalism. On the level of ideas, 
the fundamental assumptions that underwrote the regulatory state - faith 
in science, expertise, and administrative neutrality - seemed increasingly 
dubious and misconceived. On the level of politics, the war in Vietnam 
pitted Johnson's Great Society against a rising tide ofantiwar sentiment that 
increasingly enlisted the support of women, students, liberals, intellectuals, 
and racial minorities. Those core elements of the Democratic coalition came 
to view the war as a political betrayal, and an outspoken radical minority 
transformed the very word "liberal" into a term of derision. At the same 
time, other key elements of the coalition veered off in the opposite direction. 
Many white Americans, including urban workers and ethnic Catholics, 
grew increasingly angry at civil rights advances, antiwar activism, and 
what they regarded as the social and cultural outrages that exploded in 
the decade's second half. To make matters worst, organized labor, a central 
pillar of the Democratic coalition, began shrinking in both membership and 
influence. 
The result was rupture and defeat. In 1968 the anti-war movement drove 
Johnson from office, and disafliicted Democrats - some by voting Repub-
lican and others by abstaining in protest - helped elect Nixon president. 
Campaigning against crime, radicalism, affirmative action, and the Warren 
Court itself, Nixon joined leftist radicals in blaming liberalism for the 
nation's problems. Although the election was close, it marked the begin-
ning of the end of the New Deal order. 
If the 1960s had been strife-torn but optimistic, the r97os were strift:-
torn and pessimistic. Dominated by the party's left wing, the Democrats lost 
disastrously in 1972, and the Republicans suffered an equally humiliating 
blow two years later when the Watergate scandal forced Nixon into the first 
presidential resignation in the nation's history. The civil rights movement 
fragmented over both goals and tactics, while white resentments stoked il 
burning opposition that focused on school busing and affirmative action. 
The war in Viemam, moreover, came to an excruciating end when the United 
States withdrew its forces in 197_') and then watched as the Communist 
North conquered the South, the fanatic Khmer Rouge seized control of 
neighboring Cambodia, and literally millions of Southeast Asians -- many 
of whom had loyally supported the United States during the war - were 
murdered, starved to death, or drowned trying to escape. Further, l?.oe 1'. 
\¥/Cl{/e lx·gan to unite moral traditionalists, Evangelical Protestants, and the 
Catholic Church in a passionate anti-abortion movement that widened what 
seemed an unbridgeable moral divide among Americans. At the same time 
the Yorn Kippur War in the Mideast triggered an Arab oil embargo and 
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drastic price incrl'aSl'S that created a severe tnergy crisis. The result was a 
steep rcTes,ion and a dehil1tating inflation that lingered into the 1980s. 
Fundamental economic problems - severe inflation, sharply rising interest 
rates, high lcvc,Js of unemploymenr, and persistent l"Conomic stagnation -
compounded the national downswing. Increasingly, American industry lost 
out to foreign competition, and in 1971 the nation wirnessed its first trade 
deficit in almost a century, a deficit that multiplied more· than tenfold 
by 1981. Finally, a grisly national humiliation capped the decade. Iran, a 
critical Cold War ally, frll to a violently anti-American Islamic movement 
that seized the lJnited States embassy and held seventy-six Americans as 
hostages. Daily television coverage carried anti-American denunciations 
across the world; and, when a rescue mission failed in early 1980, the 
nation watched in horror as Iranian radicals gloated over the burnt remains 
0 fdead American soldiers and their crashed helicopters. 
Those evellts combined to destroy the New Deal order, but they failed 
to generate a successor regime that was equally stable and well ddined. 
Tlic, economic depression of the 19yis had confromed the nation with a 
single and overwhcl rn ing cha! lenge, one that focused atrention and inrcrests 
on a 11arional effort to revive and reform the economy. In conrrast, the 
j)sychological dq11-c,sion of the 1970s envelopc,d the nation in a web of 
amorphous anxieties and multi-cornered conflicts. If rhc earlier depression 
had pitted business and the wealthy against the u11employed and the middle 
class, the later one rended to divide Americans into a spli mered mu lri rude of 
groups identified not only by economic and class position but also by race, 
age, region, gender, religion, erhniuty, sexual orientation, and pol1tical 
1ckology. The C,milmf Prodm't.1 idea of "discrete am! insular minoriries" 
seemed to have become the "big bang" of a new and fragnwnti 11g politico-
cultural universe. 
One rl'sult was that both I iberals and conservatives showed a chastened 
'>ense of limits. Liberals enjoyed their maior successes m opposing the war 
and cultivating a growing concern with the environnwnt. The former was 
Premised on the limits of Amcrican powc·r and the latter rn1 rhe limits of 
industrial society. Conservativc·s enjoyed their grcatesr triumphs in hrin,g-
ing rrad1tional religious ideas and neo-classic economic thinking imo rhe 
Political rnainstrea;n. The former was based 011 rhe mandate of,: transcen-
dent Cod and the larrc,r on the iron laws of the market. All rdlcned a 
dee! ining fa 1th in the power of reason, science, and governmc·11t to bend rlw 
future to the nation's wishes. 
\Vluk rhe psychological depression deepened, other forces were begin-
ning to nudge Americans in m,w directions. One was a complex but pro-
found scr of attirnd inal changes: escalating distrust of government, rescnt-
nienr against minorities, hostility toward w<:>lfare programs, rejection of 
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"liberalism" and its regulatory tradition, and a fostering anger directed 
against challenges to traditional religious and moral ideas - particularly 
feminism, abortion rights, and gay liberation. A second factor was a long-
brewing revitalization of market economics. lc>gether with the general 
assault on government and scientific expertise, the spreading marker ide-
ology helped turn the nation roward deregulation, privatization, and ,1 
renewed faith in the power of private enterprise and the virtue of becoming 
rich. A third factor was the formation of what appeared to be a new Repub-
lican majority based on the merger of the party's traditional supporters -
especially business, the well-to-do, rural Amtrica, and the old Anglo-Saxon 
middle class - with new social ,1sroups, such as Catholics, ethnic whites, dis-
affected members of the working class, the culturally conservative "solid 
South," and the growing fi:irces of Evangelical Protestantism. 
Drawing the new Republican coalition together was a cultural synthesis 
that implicitly reversed the values of Cc1ro!e!le Prodmt.1 and post-New Deal 
liberalism. Disillusioned intellectuals began to articulate a new conserva-
tive ideology that called for a return to "authority" and to a social order 
build solely on "merit." Market theorists developed the idea that politicians 
responded only to organized interest groups that sought to use government 
to gain special favors contrary to the common good - '"rent seeking," as they 
called it. Traditional conservatives and Evangelical groups maintained that 
secular liberal ism and the welfare state were undermining the nation's moral 
fiber, family values, and religious foundations. Business interests sought to 
minimize their legal liabilities and avoid regulatory requirements by claim-
ing that their producrivity was at the mercy of"frivolous" lawsuits brought 
by dishonest or deluded claimants seeking undeserved windfalls. Property 
owners and other groups, squt:ezed by recession and angered at government 
spending on social welfare programs, organized "taxpayer revolts" designed 
to secure substantial reductions in local, state, and national taxation. Finally, 
those who harbored resentments against racial and ethnic minorities were 
angered by the "preferential treatml'nt" that the civil rights laws gave to 
those whom they considered unable to succeed on their own. Subtly and 
only half-consciously, those varied attitudes blended i11to a new social per-
suasion, one rhar saw the weak, disadvantaged, non-conformist, and ill 
treated as morally unworthy and judged their attempts to secure govern-
mental assistance as trickery and exploitation. Simply put, the ideology of 
the new Republican coalition transmuted ·'discrete and insular minorities" 
into "rem-seeking interest groups," the systemically disadvantaged inro 
the morally unworthy. Conversely, the idt'ology elevated business and the 
economically successful into exemplars of merit and paladins of the com-
mon good. Those groups were not special interests but pillars of economic 
growth, national might, and moral rectitudt'. Thus, it was appropriate for 
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government to foster business with deregulation and favor the prosperous 
With tax cuts. 
As New Deal liberalism had done, the new conservatism generated and 
Popularized its own supporting constitutional theories. Rejecting what they 
considered unlimited Congressional power over the economy and improper 
judicial activism by the Warren Court, co11servative thinkers sought ro 
discredit the former with revived ideas of state sovc·reigmy and the latter 
With rc·strictive ideas about separation of powers. Although they advanced 
a variety of arguments, often supported by reasoning drawn from market 
economics, they rallied around the unify111g claim that post-New Deal lib-
eralism had distorted the Consntution and abamlom·d its "original" mean-
ing. Rejecting the idea ofa "living" Constitution, they maimamed that the 
document's mcaninu was fixed and unchanL'i1w. Those not biased lw lib-h ~• ~ ; 
era] nationalism, they charged, could identify the Constitution's aurl1entic 
meaning by focusing on its text, the "original intent" or "undcrstanding" of 
its drafters and ratifiers, and the social and moral context that surrounded 
its adoption. 
Edwin Meese 111, who served as attorney general under Republican Presi-
dent H.011ald Reagan in the I ')Sos, emerged as the most prom1m·nt national 
propo11ent of the new conservative constitutional theory. The fc·deral judi-
ciary was designed to protect federal ism and I im ired govn11menr, Meese 
insisted, and "'the literal provisions of" the Constitution'" and "rhe original 
Intentions of those who framed 1t" provided the clear and correct "iudicial 
standard" for inrcrprcting its meaning. Castigating rhe "radical l\!--'.alitari-
anisrn and expansive civil liberrarianism of the Warren Court," he charged 
that liberal judicial decisions were ··ad hoc" and even "bizarre," often "more 
policy choices than articulations of const1tutional pr111ciplc." To preserve 
limited co11stitutional government and construe the C:011stirution properly, 
the• Court must return to the original imentions of the Founders, "the 
only reliable guide for judgment.'' Such a rerurn, Meese promised, "would 
Produce dcfe11sible principles of government that would 11or he tainted hy 
ickological predilection." Thus, he announcul, it "has been and will con-
tinue to lw the pol icy of th is ad 1 ,1 m 1stra ti on to pre,s for a J urispruclence of 
Original l11te11tion." 17 
Although the idea of"original imenr" was an old one a11d, like the theory 
of Caro/me Prod11c/1, had some merit, 1t suddu1lv he!--'.all to comniaml ,ttte11-
tion and inspire devotion because it was - ,tgain like Cm!/mc P/"/)d11c1.1 - a 
highly serviceable tool of constitutional politics. For the nc·w consnvar1ves, 
l) ~ 
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the idea of original intent provided theoretical grounds for discrediting 
much of the constitutional law of the preceding half-century, and it justified 
both attacks on the Warren Court and the demand for justices who would 
overturn its decisions and restore the "authentic" Constitution. Indeed, the 
concept of a normative original intent was inherently an instrument of 
doctrinal disruption and change. Asserting the existence of a "true" consti-
tutional meaning established in a distant past, the idea provided theoretical 
justification for casting off constitutional imerpretations that had evolved 
over the subsequent centuries and for rejecting judicial decisions rendered 
in more recent periods. Equally important, by making eighteemh- and 
nineteenth-century attitudes the touchstone of constitutional meaning, the 
idea promised to st1-c11,1.;then the legal and historical arguments that con-
servatives advanced against the political adversaries they opposed most 
intensely - those supporting gay rights, abortion, gun control, affirmative 
action, restrictions on the death penalty, more expansive tort liability, rigid 
separation of church and state, institutional reform litigation, and broad 
federal anti-discrimination laws. 
Influenced by Nixon's four appointees, the Burger Court began to reflect 
those spreading attitudes. Trumpeting a new concern with what it called 
"Our Federalism," it increas111gly sought to counter liberal nationalism 
by limiting the reach of federal law into the operations of state and local 
,i.;overnment. It expanded the immunity of government officials from civil 
rights suits, curtailed remedies for those injured by violations of federal 
statutes, and narrowed the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, 
it cabined many of the Warn:n Court's criminal law decisions, narrow-
ing both the Fourth Amendrnem exclusionary rule and the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel. Although it did not overrule lvlirancla 11. 1\rizo11c1, 
it repeatedly found ways to shrink its reach. Most commonly, the Court 
targeted the institutional power of the lower federal courts, developing 
a variety of procedural restrictions to limit their opportunities for liberal 
activism. It required them to abstain more frequently in favor of state 
forums, limited their power to issues writs of habeas corpus to state officials 
and to order remedies in school desegregation suits, and used the Eleventh 
Amemlrnent to deny them jurisdiction over suits against states for money 
dan1agl's. 
Although it employed the rhetoric of federalism, the Burger Court 
seemed increasingly committed to a substantively conservative political 
,1genda, especially after the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
in 198 r. Its decisions, for example, commonly deployed the rhetoric offr·d-
eralism rn close the frderal courts to groups that the new Republican coali-
tion had targeted - tort plaintiffs, uvil rights claimants, and state crimin,d 
clcfcindants. Indeed, when deference to the states led to unpalatable results, 
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the Court ofren balked. In lvlic/11.~c!ll I'. [,rm,~ ( 198 1), for example, deference 
to state decision making would have meant upholdlllg the c011stirurio11al 
claim of a criminal defendant. The Court's majority would allow 110 such 
result. lnstead, it hroadc·ned its own jurisdiction ro review decisions of stare 
Courrs and thereby extenck,d the reach of fi::dcral authority ro overt um state 
court rulings. 
Most fundamental to the federal system, 111 a 'i-1 decision in Nt1t1011al 
Lea.~11e o/Citier 1·. Usery (1976) the Burger Court sought ro strike directly 
at the New Deal legacy by revivin" the Tc:nth Amendment. Ovcrrulrnu ,l 
decision of the Waircn Court, it h~~d that the Fair Labor Standards /\ct'of 
1938 (FLSA) could not be applied to state employees and, for the first time 
since r C.J:,',7, voided a Congressional statute enacred under the commerce 
Power. Citing the Tenth Amendment, Nc/tio11C1! Let1w1e declared that there 
Were "definite Ii rn its upon the authority of Congress to n:gu late the activities 
of the States as States by means of the commerce power."' H The Court, 
Natirma! Ledg11e reasserted, was responsible for protecting the states fi·om 
national legislative power. For three liberal dissenters, Brennan rejected rl1e 
majority's holding and invoked the post-New Deal theory of rhe "political 
safeguards of federalism." The "fundamen ta! tenet of· our frdcral ism," he 
insisted, is "that the extent of federal intervention into the States· affairs" 
Was properly determined not by the Court bur "by the States' exercise of 
Political power through their represematives in Congre,s."''' 
Indicative of its transitional nature as both a third \Xlarren Court and 
the ur-Rclrnquist Court, the Burger Court - actually, a single justice -
changed its mind nine years later. Overruling N,1/irl//<1/ /,c//,~lte in another 
S-4 decision, c,·,mic1 /', Sc/// 1\11tr111io J\1ctmj/l/lii,111 'fr,1111il 1\111/,oril)' ( I 985 ), 
it upheld an application of the FLSA to a municipal transit system 011 
two closely related co11stitutional grounds. One was rhat the Constitution 
offered "no guidance about where the fromicr between state and foderal 
Power lies" and, hence, gave the justices "no license to employ freestandin,g 
conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority 
Under the Commerce Clause." The other ,ground was a liberal vusion of 
Original intent, a broad theory of the Franwrs' design: "the principal means 
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the fulernl system 
lies in the strucrure of the Federal ,govern1ne11t itself.".' In explicit tnms 
the Courr adopted the reignmg liberal theory that rhe federal system was 
\lroperly protected not by the Court hut by the "political sate-guards" that 
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Reviving the pre-New Deal views of William Howard 1~1ft and Charles 
Warren, four Republican appointees dissented vigorously. Justice Lewis 
F Powell rejected the "political safeguards" theory as both functionally 
inadequate and constitutionally unfounded, and he insisted that "judicial 
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal 
sysrem." Casting a hopeful eye to the future,Justice William H. Rehnquist, 
Nixon's last appointee and the author of National Leawte, agreed. The prin-
ciple of state sovereignty, he declared defiantly, '•will, I am confident, in 
rime again command the support of a majority of this Court. "21 Little more 
than a year later Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist Chief] ustice. 
Elected president in r 980, Reagan did far more than that. He helped 
reorient American politics, lead the nation out of the psychological depres-
sion of the r97os, and inspire a crystallizing Republican majority in its 
drive for national dominance. That coalition reelected Rea,~an in r984, put 
two other Republicans - George Bush in 1988 and George W. Bush in 
2000 - in the presidency, and forced Democrat Bill Clinton to move his 
party substantially to the right in order to scratch together two presidential 
victories in the 1990s. Equally important, the new Republican coalition 
steadily increased the party's strength in Congress, which the Democrats 
had dominatt'd since the Great Depression. After 1980 the Republicans fre-
quently controlled the Senate, and in 1994 they won control of the House, 
a position they retained to century's end. 
Reagan established both the rhetoric and direction of the new ent. 
"[G}overnment is not the solution to our problc:m," he announced. "Gov-
ernment i.1 the problc:m." 22 His greatest success came in reshaping the 
parameters of public debate and establishing the values of the new Repub-
lican coalition - religious traditionalism, suspicion of government, faith in 
business and the free market, and opposition to welfare, abortion, homo-
sexuality, and affirmative action - at the center of American politics. His 
administration pursut'd four principal policies: business deregulation, tax 
cuts weighed in favor of the wealthy, ht'avy increases in military spending, 
and a balanced budget. In large part it delivered 011 the first three and, likely 
by design, failed on the fourth - a result that led to skyrocketing fcdernl 
deficits and, consequently, to intensifying pressures to cut federal domestic 
spc:nding on welfare and othc:r social programs. Further, Reagan, who had 
opposed both the Civil Rights Act of r964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, altered the position of the federal government on civil rights issues. 
l !is administration opposed affirmative action and school busing, and it 
' 1 ,1(19 ll.S. ')7n (Powell, J, dis,srn1in1.;): i,L at .,so (Rehnquist, J, dissenting\ 
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slackcned subsra11tially fcxleral efforts to enforce the national civil rights 
laws. 
Proclairni11g a11other "New Federalism," Reaga11 sought to restructure 
the system far more suhsta11tially than Nixon had attempted. Nixon's "new 
federal ism" had unbraced the idea o/" active government. Accepting the 
need for massive federal spe11di11g it had attempted to make governmc11t 
l17ore responsive and dticic11t by decentralizing rna11agen1cnt. Its primary 
l17ethod was to ahando11 highly restrictive categorical grants 111 favor of block 
gra11rs and general tTvenue sharing, thereby rnai11ta111ing the flow of funds 
to stare and local governments hut with far kwer federal use restrictio11s. 111 
contrast, Rea,t.;,lll rejected revenue sharing and, more important, sought to 
l1li11i111ize or terminate federal financing and supervisio11 in as many areas 
as possible. I !is goal was to shrink governnwnt at all levels. Although his 
l1lost ambitious federalism proposals failed, he succeeded in ending revenue 
sharint.; and reducing fr·dcral grants to state and local governments. During 
the 1 ~8os funding "ror wclfa,re programs fell, and f{·dcral grants to stat,e 
and local government dropped by 25 percent. A!011g similar lines, Reagan 
substantially reduced k·dcral supervision over state and local governments. 
Hi, ad Ill inistration adopted adrn i nistrative procedures to slow the growth of 
federal rule making and al tern! many existing rc,t.;ulations to al low the states 
greater discretion and to relieve them of· cosrly n:pornng requirements. 
It consolidated seventy-seven categorical programs into nine broad lilock 
grams, for example, conden,ing and simplifying a wide range of" rules and 
rc•striuions. In social terms, the weak and disadvamagcd, both the working 
and non-working poor, bore the hardships and deprivat l(HlS of"his federal isrn 
reforms. 
In spite of" its cornmitmcnt to dccemralization, however, the Reagan 
adn1inistration readily embraced federal power when necessary to advance 
Its political objectives. While in most case, - welfare spending and civil 
rights enforcement, fcir example - curtailing frderal activism served its 
social purposes, there were exceptions. When business 111terests advocatn! 
hoth uniform national standards to open more miks of highway to larger 
trucks and a national product liability law restricting consumer rights, Rea-
gan supported the proposals in spite of the Lin that they required kderal 
Prcen1ption of state laws in areas of traditional state control. Similarly, his 
adn1in1stration readily advocated national standards in its dforr to impose 
Workfare requ1rune11ts on stare welfare programs, extend kderal criminal 
law to ti,ght a variety of social evils, and defeat the affirmative anion pro-
gran1s that dozens of state and local governments had cs tab! ished. 
Indeed, although Republican administrations from Nixon to the second 
George Bush formally upheld the banner of federalism, all rnnrributnl to 
the further centralization of American government. In domestic matters 
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they joined Democrats in expanding national involvement in such tradi-
tional state areas as education and family relations, and they pushed -
against determined Democratic opposition - to nationalize clements of tort 
law in order to restrict suits against business and governnwm. Further, they 
helped frderalize ever larger realms of the criminal law. Indeed, by 1996 
more than 40 percent of all federal criminal statutes had been enacted since 
Nixon's election in 1968. Similarly, the Republicans steadily reinforced 
the expansion of presidential power and the prioritization of military and 
forei,~n policy concerns. That persistent emphasis impinged on the states 
by centralizing issues of paramount public concern, expanding the de facto 
scope of frderal authority, and divcrti ng resources from domestic programs 
that the states helped control to the military and national security institu-
tions that operated under exclusive fr·deral authority. Ironically, the end of 
the Cold War between r 989 and 1991 seemed to lead only to rapid inter-
national desrabil ization, further magnification of foreign pol icy anxieties, 
and an ever greater concentration of power and discretion in the federal 
executtve. 
By the end of the 1 980s the successive achievements of post-New De,tl 
liberalism and the decentralization efforts that began after , 969 had com-
bined to alter and in some ways strengthen the nation's ft.:deral system. 
The former accomplished three critical results. First, compcllin,~ the stares 
to redistrict their legislatures, post-New Deal liberalism increased urban 
representation in many states and helped create new legislative coalitions 
that began to address the pressing problems that earlier rural-dominated 
legislatures had ignored. Second, it brought the franchise to African Amer-
icans in the South and forced broad non-discrimination policies on all 
states. The result was to ensure fairer treatment for minority groups and to 
begin mitigating abuses that had long tarnished the claim of states' rights. 
Third, federal matching grants stimulated new social programs and spurred 
many states to modernize and professionalize their governmental structures. 
Between 1 965 and r 980, for example, twenty-two states redesigned their 
executive branches; the number of state employees who worked under mcri t 
systems rose from 50 to 75 percent. Similarly, thirty-four ,rates reorganized 
and expanded their court systems, and all fifty established offices of court 
administration to address caseload hurdt·ns and increase judicial dliciency. 
Those achievements substantially enhanced the ability of the states to 
handle the consequences of the new decentralization that began in the 
1970s. On one level, the decentralization effort made the national govern-
ment rnore responsivc to state complaints about bureaucratic waste and 
unnecessary administrative burdens. The result was the elimination or sim-
plification of many fr·deral regulatory procedures and a greater flexibility 
at the state and local levels in shaping government programs. On a second 
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level, dcce11tralizatio11 allowed srates to rake greater co11trol over the pro-
grams they adm Ill istercd a11d encouraged them to modernize their adm i 11 is-
trativc structures and use their c11hanced capaci tics to initiate new programs 
and approaches of their own. Bcgi1111i11g in the 1970s the states emharknl 
0 11 a range of new i11itiatives to expand social services, improve fi11ancial 
capabilities, attract outside investment, develop energy and conservation 
programs, a11d reform their public education and criminal Justice systems. 
On a third level, the decentralization movemellt revived rhe idea oi' the 
States as laboratories that could attempt valuable social experin1ems. The 
stares began to look ro one another- rather than to the fc·deral government -
for new ideas a11d teclrniqucs, and with increasing frequency they borrowed 
from the approaches rhat their sister states had tried and fou11d effrcrive. 
Wisconsin exemplified both the era's new srate activism and its growi11g 
social conservatism. 111 the century's early decades \X/isconsi11 had pioneered 
many progressive social measures, and in the 1 990s it emerged once more as 
an innovative force, this time in developing restrictive ·'workfare" programs 
designed to reduce taxes, curtail welfare coverage and be11dirs, and compel 
recipienrs quickly to fi11d privare employment. Its approach c11couragnl 
conservative attacks on the federal welfare system and not only influencnl 
Other states but also had an impact at the 11atio11al level. l11 19,y{i Wiscons111 
again stood as a paragon of laboratory fr·,k:ralism when the fr.demi govern-
rnent invoked its experience i11 substanrially revamping the narion's welfare 
law. A m011umenral fc:deral welfare reform act c·ncoura;,;nl rhe wider use of 
Workfare requirements, clirninatnl some 11atio1ial programs, expandl"d the 
Use of block grants, and al lowed the stares greater leeway i II shaping t he1 r 
0 wn systems. 
In spite of rhe decentralization efforts, however, governmental power at 
the national level remained decisive. That facr was nowlll're more appare11t 
than in the movement to replace welfare wirh workfare. Although \X/iscon-
sin illustrated a renewed vitality in state governments, the welfare reform 
law that Congress enacted in 1996 demomtrated that the f<.-deral govern-
n1e11t remained the paramoum force in csrablish1ng national wt"lfare policy. 
'fhc an not only required the adoption of workfare policies, hut ir also 
con1pclk·d the stares to comply with a 11u111bcr of other rigorous fr.deral 
mandates, including the imposition of rime lirrnts on el1g1hility, rnluc-
tion or wirhl10ldi11g of hendirs for certain classc·s of rnipicms, rcportin,;,; 
Procedures involving the parcrnity ,llld i111111igrati011 status of undnagc 
bcnl'ficiaries, and the development of various centralized procedures for 
administering key clements of state welfare programs. 
Contemporaneous developments in the state courrs suggested similar 
conclusions about the continuing dominance of national standards. Those 
courrs had authority to construe rheir own state const1 tutions, and rhcy were 
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free in most cases to establish broader individual rights and liberties than 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized under the Federal Constitution. Not 
surprisingly, then, in the r 970s liberals reacted to the narrowing constitu-
tional decisions of the Burger Court by urging the state courts rouse their 
indcpcndem authority to counteract irs decisions by cxpanding individw1l 
rights under their separate state constitutions. Some responded, and a num-
ber of stare judges invoked their authority to establish rights broader than 
those recognizt:d in federal law. The liberal appeal to state judicial powt:r, 
however, brought only limited and scattc·red results. For tht: most part state 
courts spurnt:d their opportunities and in the ovcrwhdming majority of 
relevant cast:s chost: either to rely on frdnal constitutional law directly or 
to conform state constitutional law to the contours of federal law. Indeed, 
when the courts of Cal ifomia and Florida refused to follow decisions of the 
Burger Court, they were abruptly reigned in. Both states responded with 
constitutional amendments that required their state courts to bring tht:ir 
interprt:tations of certain state constitutional provisions into conformity 
with the decisions of tlit: U.S. Supremt: Court. 
The relativdy conformist behavior of the state courts suggested sevt:nd 
interrelated conclusions about American fr·dt:ralisrn in the late twentieth 
ct:ntury. One was that undcrly111g social, cultural, and economic forces were 
continuing relentlessly to centralize national affairs. ln spite of the swdling 
paeans to fodcralism, Americans were ever more commonly advancing their 
val ut:s and policies as properly "national" in scope. Although they frequently 
and sometimes bitterly disputed rhe naturt: of the values that were proper, 
they nevertheless insisted ever more stridently that their own values -
whatever they were - be given national recognition. The second conclu-
sion was that the U.S. Supreme Court was playing an ever more prominent 
and important role in public affairs. To a growing number of Americans it 
was the truly "supreme" authority that could and should rulc on all major 
issues that faced the nation. Americans were beginning to view the Court, 
in other words, as they had come to view the presidency - as an institution 
that should address not only problems that were properly "national" in 
some antecedent and technical co11stitutional sense but also all issues that 
had become, as a practical fact of everyday life, important to the nation as a 
whole. A third conclusion was that the concept of"federalism" had lost most 
of its substalltive meaning as an mdependent normative guide to the dis-
tribution of governmental powers. While theories of federalism continued 
to proliferate and activists of all stripes persisted in invoking the concept's 
authoriry, little remained of the idea that could not readily bt: turned to 
partisan use by able and designing hands. The fourth and last conclusion 
was that a politically conservative and socially ungenerous mood had come 
to pervade political attitudes across the nation. The state courts properly 
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followed the U.S. Supreme C:ourr, many Americans sc<:'mcd to believe, not 
just because it was the authoritative voice of the national Constitution but 
also because it was - with a fi_,w glaring exceptions - moving that law, for 
the time at least, in the general directions they considered desirable. 
Although the Court increasingly reflected the values of the 1ww Repub-
lican coalition, Reagan and his successors failed to transform the Supreme 
Court as quickly or completely as the New Deal had done. lktwec11 19_15 
and 1969 the Democrats had controlled the presidency for twenty-eight of 
thirty-six years, the Senate for al I but four of those years, and both together 
for twenty-four years. Conversely, in the decades after 1 968 the Repub-
licans controlled borh the presidency and the Senate simultaneously for 
only six years, 1981 through 1987, a period in which only two vacancies 
occurred. Thus, Republican nominations were commonly subject to Demo-
cratic check. Then, further d ii uri ng thci r drive for control, during the 1 990s 
Clinton was able to add two moderate liberals to the Court. 
Even though Republican presidents were responsible for ten of the twelve 
Justices placed on the Court after 19(i8, their new appointees failed to form 
a consistently united bloc. Indeed, only three of them pushed aggressively 
and relentlessly to implement the values of the new Republican coalition. 
In contrast, three others edged 111to the Court's moderate-to-liberal wing, 
and the remaining four were often cautious and respectful of precedent, 
rather than ideological and ardent for change. As borh conservatives and 
0 Pponenrs of judicial activism, the moderate four may havl' fc·lc thernsclves 
bound to honor the principle of.11,;re deu11J and to rcmaill for rhc most part 
Within existing constitutional challnels. Thus, a comhillarion of external 
chccks, internal barriers of role alld doctrint', and differing jurisprudenrial 
orit'ntations prevented abrupt change in many areas. 
Although a variety of obstacles slowed Republicall efforts to remake the 
federal judiciary, the party's determined drive nevertheless beg,m to bri11g 
increasingly substantial results by the late 1980s. Methodically appomting 
ideologically sympathetic judges, Reagan and Bush increasillgly turned the 
lower frderal judiciary toward the values of the new Rcpublirnll coalitirn1. 
Far more visibly, they did the same to the Supreme Court. Reagan markedly 
changed its direction when he elevated Rehnquist to the cenrcr chair Ill 
T986 and then added conservative Justices Antonin Scalia alld Anthony 
Kennedy to the bench. Then, when Bush replaced liberal.Justice Thurgood 
Marshal 1, the last survivor of the Warren Court, with the rigidly consnvative 
J List ice Clarence Thomas in 1991, he established a relatively firm five-justice 
conservative bloc that began to an with increasing boldness. 
In the name of frderalism the new majority took particular aim at the 
Powers of Congress, and in the century's last eight years it voided at least 
ten Congressional statutes Oil frderal ism groullds. In LI 11i1ed St11/e.1 1·. l-11/1e:: 
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( 1995), the five-justice bloc voided the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which 
made it a crime knowingly to possess a gun near a school. The decision 
seemed to limit the Commerce Clause to formally "economic" activities 
that Congress could show were directly related to interstate commerce. Five 
years later in U nitecl Stet/es l'. Morri.1011 (2000) the same five justices relied on 
Loj1ez to void a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that created a 
federal remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. Such violence, the 
Court explained, was "not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.""' 
Similarly, the Court deployed the judicially created doctrine of standing to 
trump Congressional power to enforce federal environmental laws through 
private lawsuits, and it even suggested doctrinal grounds for possible fi_1ture 
use in enforcing limits on the spending power. 
More pointedly, reacting against national regulation of state and lonil 
governments, the Court severely constrained frderal power over the states 
themselves. First, in 1996 it held that the Eleventh Amendment barred 
Congress from using its commerce power to create claims against states, 
and thn:'e years later it extended that holding to all of Congress's Article I 
powers. Second, it narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment for the same pur-
pose. Although the Court did not challenge the principle that Congress 
could abrogate state sovereign immunity whe11 legislating under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it created severe limitations on the power 
and invalidated a series of' Congressional statutes that imposed liabili-
ties on states for violating federal civil rights statutes. Finally, the Court 
f'urthcr insulated the states from federal power by developin,l( an "anti-
commandeering" principle that forbad Congress from requiring states or 
their officials to assist in implementing federal regulatory programs. 
Although the Rehnquist Court revived the Tenth Amendment, it did 
not use it to remove a broad category of "Joni!" activities from federal 
authority as the Taft Court had clone in Drexel f11mit11re. Rather, in the 
spirit of Nation,d LM,~llf, it employed the amendment more narrowly and 
seemed primarily interested in protecting the operations and institutions 
of the state governments themselves. Its decisions restricting the lower 
foderal judiciary paralleled its decisions limiting Congressional power. The 
Rehnquist Court curtailed federal habeas corpus, shrank remedial authority 
over institutional reform suits, and narrowed substantive liabilities under 
federal statutory and constitutional provisions in order to minimize federal 
Judicial intervention in the operations of state and local governments. 
Beyond insulating state governments, the Rehnquist Court's decisions 
limiting Congressional power seemed targeted primarily at civil rights leg-
islation. Its Commerce Clause decisions limited Congressional authority 
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to activities that were primarily "economic;" its Section 5 decisions struck 
directly at the principal Congressional power specifically designed ro pro-
t('ct disadvantaged social groups. Politically, then, the Court's efforts to 
constrain Congress seemed to reflect rhe social and cultural strains of the 
new H.epublican coalition more than its free marker and business-oriented 
aS]XTtS. 
The Rehnquist Court's lack of sympathy with the federal civil rights 
laws was apparent. Immediately after the last Reagan appoi11t<.'l' took his 
sear i11 1 <J88, ir issued a stunning scriL·s of decisions that method1cally 
narrowed rhe uvil rights laws and restricted the remedies available for their 
violation. I ts decisions struck most ruthlessly ar affirmative action programs 
and employment discrimination law. Revealingly, when the Court dealt 
With affirmative action, it readily set aside its goal of insulating the states 
and imposed federal constitutional restrictions on their power to establish 
such programs. 
Th<: political sig11ilicancc of the Court's civil rights decisions was clear. 
Si11ce I ')68 Repuhl ica11s had dqiloyed the language of federal ism to shape 
a "Southern strategy" that sought white votes by opposing uvil rights 
activism allll, in particular, affirmative action programs. The Reagan admin-
istration had followed the same course, imensifying rhe rhetoric, limiting 
cnforcenwm of the civil rights laws, and - for the first rime si11ce llrou·11 -
bringing the fc:deral goveinment into court to oppose civil rights claims. 
Then, in 1 <J88 Reagan's vice president, (;corgc Bush, was elcnnl presidu1r 
after a campaig11 rhar prornis<:d "law and order" and featured a notorious 
tckvision advntisement rhat was widely perceived to be racist. When rhe 
Democratic Congress attempted to pass legislation to coumcr the Relrn-
quist Court's civil rights decisions, Bush vetoed one bill and then compelled 
Congress to weaken another before signing it. The Rehm1uisr Court's civil 
rights decisions fit snugly with the Republican program. 
Nor surprisingly, the Rehnquist Court also followed the Reagan a11d 
Bush administrations in asserting national authority to enforce other val-
lies of the Republican coalition. Joining the effort to restrin tort claims 
against husl!less, it readily displaced state law when fr·dcral rules served the 
Purpose. Similarly, it expanded fr·deral power under the Due Process and 
'Etkings Clauses, l1111irnl state power rn cnforc<: environmental regulano11s, 
and applied a broad First An1e11dment righr or association to allow large 
private organizations ro exclude homosexuals. Indeed, in decisions protecr-
'11g private property, it again set state authoriry aside by im11osing a federal 
constitutional duty on states to provide tax rdi.mds Ill certain cases and, 
further, suggested rhar the 'fakmgs Clause might override star<: sovereign 
1
_11"11llunity and allow federal courts to order statl'S to pay just compensation 
for certain regulatory actions. 
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Equally reve::aling, howe::ver, the:: Rehnquist Court also asserted federal 
authority for othe::r purpose::s as wdl. lt enfiirced First Amendme::nt limits 
on gove::rnments at all le::ve::ls, and it use::d the:: negative:: Commerce Clause 
and the doctrine of implied preemption to displace state law and expa11d 
the reach of much fede::ral le::gislation. Indeed, during the last decade of· the 
twentieth century the Rehnquist Court v01ded actions taken by states 111 
54.7 percent of the relevant cases it de::cided ( 1 1 1 of 201,), an invalidation 
rate that was slightly higher than the Warre::n Court's rate of51,.<i percent in 
such cases during its sixte::en years of existence ( 1 28 of 2 -i9). Most artTsting, 
on occasion it e::ven asse::rted national powe::r in ways that conflicted with 
the values of the Republican coalition - though only over scathing disse11ts 
from the justices most fervently committed to those valuc:s. A slim, mod-
erate majority, for example, preserved the:: federal constitutional right to an 
abortion and used the Pourteenth Amendment on occasion to protect both 
women and homosexuals. 
Thus, in spite of its rhe::toric, the Rehnquist Court did not simply defer 
to the states or check national power in all areas. Nor, of course, did it 
invariably honor the values of the Republican coalition. Rather, it did what 
its predc:cc:ssors had done: it c:nforced its own peculiar version of fr·deral ism as 
determ ine::d by shifting coalitions among its j usticc:s, c:ach of whom sought ro 
meet the new and u11expected challenges that were genc:ratcd by a changing 
and dynamic society. Like the liberal Courts that followed the New Deal, 
it reflected the variations and inconsistencies of its nine: justicc·s as well 
as the characteristic values that marked thl' shared jurisprudential ideas 
of its generally dominant majority. Indeed, as its frequent willin,~ness to 
assert a muscular federal judicial power evidenced, the Rehnquist C:ourt 
seemed driven as much by three substantive social goals as by any principlc:d 
concern for the states. It sought to limit government regulatory authority, 
particularly in the areas of civil rights and environmental protection; it 
sought to restrict lawsuits against both business and governme::nts; and it 
sought to shrink the rights of criminal defendants and prison inmates. 
Bc:yond the specific social policies it sl'rved, the Rehnquist Court stood 
at century's end 011 three fundamental propositions about Arnc:rican fc:dcral-
isrn. One: was that the power of Congress had become all encompassing and 
that limited constitutional government required the imposition of some 
kind of dfoctive limits. The second was that the power of the narional gov-
c:rnment over the statc:s thc:msclves had to be circumscribed sc:vercly. The 
last was that the: "political safo,~uards" offrderalism, whatc:ve::r their efficacy 
in prior times, were no longer adequate to chc:ck federal power and protect 
state indc:pendc:nce. All three propositions pointed to the same conclusion: 
the Court itself must enforce limits on national power. 
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However sound thl:' Court's premisl:'s a11d conclusion, at century's C:'nd 
the fundamental - and operational - questions remained as they had been 
ever since 1 78sr What specific vision of kderal ism should he adoptecL' 
What specific limits should he enfcJrcecL' Which governments -- and which 
branches of government - should be subject to fednalism's limitatirn1s 1 For 
what purposes, and in whose interests' 
CONCLUSION AMERICAN FIDERALISM AT CliNTllRY'S FND 
The twemicth cenrury ended, almost literally, wirh limb 1·. (,'01·e (2oorJ). 
There, the five-justice Rehnquist majority asserted a quesrirnwhlc jurisdic-
tion to determine who would win the presidential elccrion of 2000 and 
then, on sharply colltested grounds, rull:'d in favor of Republican George 
W. Bush. 
In the most dramatic manner possible the decision rl:'vealed two funda-
mental characteristics of American fr·dcralism. First, it demonstrated the· 
extent to which the Supreme Court had n1oved to a position of institutional 
centrality in American government. In troubled elections 111 1800 and 
r824 the I louse of Representatives had follownl constitunonal provisions 
in determining who would be the next prcsidcm. In the bitterly disputed 
tkcrion of 1870 a speual extra-constitutional ccrn11nission composed of 
hve representatives each from the Senate, I louse, and Supreme Court had 
convened to i-csolve the same issue. Notwithstanding prior practice, co11-
stitutio11al clauses, and statutory provisions that suggested Congress or the 
state legislature as the authoritative 111stitutio11, the Court stL·ppnl imo the 
disputed elecrion of 2000 and dcudcd the outcome. Alone. No hrallch of 
Congress sought to intervene or participate, and no branch of state govern-
ment moved to oppose. Deeply and closely divided, the nation acceptnl the 
C:ourr's decisive roll:' as practically necessary and co11stitutio11ally proper. 
B11.1h 1: Gore capped the Rehnqu1.st Court's basic institmional achieve-
rncnr: confirming the evolutio11 of the role a!ld authority of the federal 
judiciary - and, ;iarticularly, the Supreme Court itself~ that h«d occurred 
0 vn the previous century or longer. That evolution had elevated the C:ourc, 
With the lower j ud iuary as its wide-reaching arms, co a position of· sweepi 11,g 
1nstitutio11al authority. Repeatedly, the Rehnquist Court insisted that 1t 
Was the final arbiter of rhe Constitution, and it hrou,gllt llL'W viral1ry ro the 
Warren Court's pronouncernenr of Judicial authonty in Coojh'/' 1·. !Lmw. "It 
is the responsibility of this C:ourt, nor Congress, co define the suhstame of 
constitutional guarancees," 21 it declared in shrinking Congressional power 
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and asserting its own primacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Not 
surprisi11gly, the Rehnquist Court exceeded the Warren Court in the rate 
at which it held federal as well as state actions unconstitutional. 
Second, l31/.\h I'. Gore exempli tied the shifting, contested, and instrumen-
talist nature of American federalism. Although some oft he legal issues were 
novel, the decisive constirnrional issue was stark: did authority to settle the 
matter reside at the state or national leveP Unlike the many cases in which 
rhe ideology of the new Republican coal1rion coincided with deference to 
the states, in 1311.1h z•. Gore the two conHicced. The Jive-justice majority 
bloc rushed to trump state sovereignty with national power. "[T}he fedend 
government is not bad but good," one of the majority justices had cold 
a const'rvative audience some two decades earlier before ascending to the 
Courr. "The trick is to use it wisely." 2 ' As the twentieth century ended, 
L311Jh z: Gore stood as a monument to the dynamics of American federalism, 
the system's paradigmatic case. 
Thus, in spite of the many changes that reshaped the system and restruc-
tured its opt:rations, American federal ism closed the twentieth century 
much as it had begun it, as a somnvhat disjointt:d a11d malleable, but nev-
erthelt:ss stablt: and democratic, systt'm of governmenr with the capacity 
to confront new problems a11cl adapr to nt:w conditions. A variety of social 
and cul rural factors sustaim·d its working order: a strikinp;ly diverse popu-
lation that e11joycd prosperity, education, and freedom; a variety of frirrnal 
and i11formal checks that helped coumt:r concentrated powt'r; the mgrained 
social values, cultural habits, and institutional practices that constituted 
the natio11·s viral, if inherently human, rule of law; and a sustaining popular 
faith that the nation was committed, ultimately if quite imperfectly, to rhe 
lofty ideals it formally proclaimed. American federalism maintained itself 
in the twentieth century not because the Constitution set forth bright lint:s 
that defined state and federal power or because the Court articulated its own 
consistent and unchanging rules but because the system's complex opera-
tions were shaped and constrained by that social, cultural, and institutional 
base. 
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